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Abstract 
Perceptual decision-making refers to the ability to arrive at categorical judgments about 
states of the outside world. Here we use functional magnetic resonance imaging and 
multivariate pattern analysis to identify decision-related brain regions and address a number 
of open issues in the field of perceptual decision-making. 
 In the first study (Hebart et al., 2012), we demonstrated that perceptual decisions 
about motion direction are represented in both visual and parietal cortex, even when 
decoupled from motor plans. While in early visual cortex the amount of information about 
perceptual choices follows the amount of sensory evidence presented on the screen, the 
reverse pattern is observed in left posterior parietal cortex. These results reveal the brain 
regions involved when choices are encoded in an abstract format and suggest that these two 
brain regions are recruited differently depending on the amount of sensory evidence 
available. 
 In the second study (Hebart et al., submitted), we show that the perceptual decision 
variable (DV) is represented throughout fronto-parietal association cortices. The DV in right 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex covaries specifically with brain signals in the ventral striatum 
representing confidence, demonstrating a close link between the two variables. This 
suggests that confidence is calculated from the perceptual DV encoded in ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex. 
 In the third study (Christophel et al., 2012), using a visual short-term memory 
(VSTM) task, we demonstrate that the content of VSTM is represented in visual cortex and 
posterior parietal cortex, but not prefrontal cortex. These results constrain theories of VSTM 
and suggest that the memorized content is stored in regions shown to represent perceptual 
decisions. Together, these results shed light on the neuronal code underlying perceptual 
decision-making in humans and offer the prospect for a more complete understanding of 
these processes. 
 Zusammenfassung 
Die Fähigkeit, Zustände in der Außenwelt zu beurteilen und zu kategorisieren, wird unter 
dem Oberbegriff „perzeptuelles Entscheiden“ zusammengefasst. In der vorliegenden Arbeit 
wurde funktionelle Magnetresonanztomografie mit multivariater Musteranalyse verbunden, 
um offene Fragen zur perzeptuellen Entscheidungsfindung zu beantworten. 
 In der ersten Studie (Hebart et al., 2012) wurde gezeigt, dass der visuelle und 
parietale Kortex eine Repräsentation abstrakter perzeptueller Entscheidungen aufweisen. Im 
frühen visuellen Kortex steigt die Menge entscheidungsspezifischer Information mit der 
Menge an verfügbarer visueller Bewegungsinformation, doch der linke posteriore parietale 
Kortex zeigt einen negativen Zusammenhang. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, wo im Gehirn 
abstrakte Entscheidungen repräsentiert werden und deuten darauf hin, dass die gefundenen 
Hirnregionen unterschiedlich in den Entscheidungsprozess involviert sind, je nach Menge an 
verfügbarer sensorischer Information. 
In der zweiten Studie (Hebart et al., submitted) wurde gezeigt, dass sich eine Repräsentation 
der Entscheidungsvariable (EV) im fronto-parietalen Assoziationskortex finden lässt. Ferner 
weist die EV im rechten ventrolateralen präfrontalen Kortex (vlPFC) einen spezifischen 
Zusammenhang mit konfidenzbezogenen Hirnsignalen im ventralen Striatum auf. Die 
Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Konfidenz aus der EV im vlPFC berechnet wird. 
 In der dritten Studie (Christophel et al., 2012) wurde gezeigt, dass der 
Kurzzeitgedächtnisinhalt im visuellen und posterioren parietalen Kortex, nicht jedoch im 
präfrontalen Kortex repräsentiert wird. Diese Ergebnisse lassen vermuten, dass der 
Gedächtnisinhalt in denselben Regionen enkodiert wird, die auch perzeptuelle 
Entscheidungen repräsentieren können. Zusammenfassend geben die hier errungenen 
Erkenntnisse Aufschluss über den neuronalen Code des perzeptuellen Entscheidens von 
Menschen und stellen ein vollständigeres Verständnis der zugrundeliegenden Prozesse in 
Aussicht. 
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“La vie est la somme de tous vos choix” 
(“Life is the sum of all your choices.”) 
 
Albert Camus 
1. General introduction 
 
Whenever we interact with our environment, we are faced with decisions. Whenever there is 
more than one alternative, we can decide between them. A wrong decision can have quite 
devastating consequences, while a correct decision most often goes unnoticed. Humans can 
navigate through highly complex and unpredictable environments, yet they can do so without 
much effort and often without even noticing. Making everyday decisions such as which food 
to buy in the supermarket seems to be a simple matter; so simple that their investigation 
could be perceived as a trivial problem. 
Only when we analyze the details of the decision-making process it becomes clear 
that decision-making is not as trivial a matter as might be thought (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; 
Platt et al., 2008). The detail at which people analyze decision-making can vary, and there 
are different theoretical ideas about how we form decisions (Kable and Glimcher, 2009). A 
superficial analysis would contain the following steps necessary to form a decision: The 
decision maker has to be motivated and physically able to carry out the decision at all. She 
needs to have knowledge of the different alternatives she can decide between. She needs to 
observe evidence about a state of the world (immediate or from memory) in favor or against 
any of these alternatives. Most current models assume that she would sample different 
pieces of evidence or that she repeatedly observes evidence, and that she finally sums up – 
or “accumulates” – all these pieces of evidence. Finally, she makes a decision if the evidence 
in favor of one option exceeds a certain response criterion, but the accumulation process and 
the criterion can be affected by the overall likelihood of each alternative, the expected value 
associated with each alternative, and other priors. 
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To understand these processes, consider the following example. When Miss Marple, 
a character from the novels of Agatha Christie, finally solves a criminal case, she explains in 
detail what clues (“evidence”) were needed to reach a verdict against one suspect and to 
exonerate others. In the beginning she may have been biased towards a previously 
convicted suspect (“overall likelihood”), but was quite cautious making her decision (setting 
the “criterion” high), because she assumed that in this case having no suspect arrested 
would still be better than arresting a suspect who actually did not commit the crime (“decision 
value1”). 
Although such characters often appear to follow quite logical trains of thought to 
come up with a conclusion, in reality our decisions are often biased and driven by intuitions, 
heuristics, emotions, or more generally the way be believe the world around us works 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). Even unconscious prior assumptions about the world, e.g. 
that beautiful people are nice people, can affect our decisions (Greenwald et al., 1998). It 
should be evident by now that decision-making is not as trivial as may be thought. 
 
1.1 Perceptual decision-making 
One form of decision-making which deals with decisions based on sensory stimuli is 
perceptual decision-making. Typically, in perceptual decision-making continuous sensory 
information is transformed into a limited number of perceptual categories, and appropriate 
actions are performed using the decision making processes described above.2 Even very 
simple everyday decisions – such as stopping at a red light – are supposed to follow this 
scheme. Arriving at a perceptual decision and carrying out an action associated with a 
perceptual category is called a perceptual choice. 
1 To be more precise, the term decision value refers to the value of a decision, i.e. how much the 
decision is worth to the subject, a term often be mixed up with decision variable which will be 
introduced later. 
2 The description of the transformation being from continuous to discrete is in most cases accurate. Of 
course, sensory information can sometimes also be quite discrete which would make the decision-
making process very simple, and the responses of perceptual decisions response can also take a 
continuum, e.g. when exerting a certain level of force to the gas pedal or steering the wheel while 
driving a car. 
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Perceptual decision-making is not only interesting in terms of choosing the 
appropriate action from several alternatives: It can be seen as a simple role model for more 
complex decisions. While it is difficult to quantify how Miss Marple accumulated her evidence 
based on her clues, in the field of perceptual decision-making typically a limited number of 
alternative choices are used, together with simple sensory information that can be varied in a 
continuous manner across several dimensions, e.g. color, shape, or motion direction (Gold 
and Shadlen, 2007). In addition, studies of perceptual decision-making are often conducted 
with stimulus categories and motor outputs for which brain responses are comparably well 
understood (Britten, 2003). The hope is that once the basic properties of simple perceptual 
decisions are understood, in the long run these results could be extended to more 
complicated scenarios (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). Recent results suggest that this indeed is 
possible, by applying findings from perceptual decision-making to a larger number of 
response alternatives (Churchland et al., 2008), decision-making about probabilities (Yang 
and Shadlen, 2007), confidence about simple decisions (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009), and even 
economic decisions (Hare et al., 2011). 
 
1.2 Signal detection theory 
The foundation for most of today’s research on perceptual decision-making – both 
conceptually and mathematically – can be seen in signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 
1966). Originally developed in research financed by the U.S. Air Force to detect weak signals 
with radars (Marcum, 1948), it has later been very successfully applied to human 
psychophysical detection and discrimination performance (Tanner and Swets, 1954), 
because it offers a measure of the information available to an observer that is not 
confounded by decision bias. In SDT, correct and incorrect responses are treated separately 
based on whether a stimulus is present or absent (Figure 1A). It turns out that while the 
overall correctness of an observer is not ideal for indicating his ability to discriminate 
between presence and absence of a stimulus, SDT can be used to estimate this ability, 
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which is known as the sensitivity d’. For example, a radiologist may often be incorrect with 
his diagnosis: He may perform very well in telling that a subject has a tumor (“hit”), but be 
reasonably bad in diagnosing a healthy person as healthy (“correct rejection”). However, this 
has to do with what is called decision bias, also known as the decision criterion c. He prefers 
to make errors in which he falsely detects tumors (“false alarm”), because these errors lead 
him to finding a tumor more often when it is there, and such errors are in his view not as bad 
as falsely missing a tumor (“miss”). In fact, he may well be able to discriminate between a 
tumor and no tumor, but based on a simple analysis of correctness one could falsely 
conclude that the radiologist is doing a poor job in discriminating healthy from ill. The ability 
to discriminate refers to the extraction of sensory evidence under uncertainty, and this 
uncertainty stems from background noise. SDT can provide answers to the question of how 
well an observer performs in relating predefined categories to predefined actions and how his 
choice is influenced by his aptness to choose one rather than another response (Macmillan 
and Creelman, 2005). 
In a simple signal detection scenario, each particular stimulus – whether it contains 
signal or not – can be treated as falling on a decision axis along which the observer 
discriminates (Figure 1B). In the simplest case, this axis is one-dimensional. Importantly, 
however, this axis does not need to follow one particular physical characteristic of the 
stimulus, but can also be seen as a line through a space spanned by an arbitrary number of 
stimulus dimensions (such as size, shape, color) where each dimension is differently 
weighted, just as long as any of these dimensions are used for making the decision and that 
the decisions are not weighted differently across observations. SDT assumes that an 
observer has some knowledge of the probability with which each stimulus will have a certain 
value along this axis. In other words, the observer is supposed to know the probability 
density functions for both stimulus classes, in our example signal present vs. signal absent. 
For difficult classifications, these two density functions overlap which means that an observer 
necessarily is going to make some mistakes. Discriminability is described as the difference 
between the z-transformed hit and false alarm rates: 
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d’ = z(HR) – z(FR) 
The criterion c refers to the point on the axis at which the observer separates between both 
categories (Figure 1B). The hit rate HR is the area under the probability density function of 
the signal distribution, ranging on the decision axis from c to infinity, the false alarm rate FR 
is the area under the probability density function of the noise distribution with the same 
range, and z(p) denotes the inverse cumulative Gaussian distribution. Importantly, the 
discriminability stays the same, no matter how the criterion is set. 
 
Figure 1. The signal detection theory framework. (A) In signal detection theory, correct and 
incorrect responses are treated differently depending on whether a stimulus was present or 
absent. This allows estimating the sensitivity of an observer in discriminating between the 
presence and absence of a stimulus, independent of the response criterion he applies for his 
choice. (B) According to signal detection theory, the observer decides along a hypothetical 
decision axis. The probability density functions denote the probability for a signal to have a 
specific intensity along the axis. All intensity values larger than the criterion are treated as 
belonging to one category (e.g. “signal present”) whereas all intensity values smaller than the 
criterion belong to the other category (e.g. “no signal present”). 
 
SDT has been and still is one of the most valuable quantitative approaches to 
investigating perceptual decision-making. Nevertheless, SDT is neutral with respect to the 
exact instantiation of the process of evidence accumulation. In addition, this theory captures 
only the “performance” aspect of behavior, but does not incorporate the profile of subjects’ 
response times which also varies depending on the difficulty of the stimulus discrimination. 
SDT does not provide information about the timing of events, so an extension in the time 
domain that can incorporate reaction times may be helpful for a more complete 
understanding of behavior (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). This would have another advantage: 
As mentioned above in the example with Miss Marple, there are different sources of priors, 
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including the expected value and the overall likelihood of each option which affect the 
accumulation of evidence and the criterion of the subject. In SDT, these sources are treated 
as one variable (the criterion), but a separation of them would be quite valuable in explaining 
behavior. Since these different priors differentially contribute to the decision making process 
at different points in time, they may be better distinguished using information about how the 
decision evolves across time. Finally, a theory of choices incorporating response times could 
naturally provide a framework for the speed-accuracy trade-off which refers to the fact that 
faster responses often come at the cost of increased error rates (Luce, 1986). 
 
1.3 Sequential sampling models of perceptual decision-making 
Sequential sampling models – also known as integrator models – can be seen as an 
extension of SDT in the time domain. All sequential sampling models have in common that 
the sensory evidence available to the observer is repeatedly sampled and accumulated 
across time. Repeated sampling is necessary, because the neuronal representation of 
sensory evidence is inherently noisy, i.e. it fluctuates randomly from moment to moment 
(Ratcliff and Smith, 2004). When an accumulator reaches a specified criterion a response 
can be executed. Thus, the accuracy is given by the criterion – or bound – that is reached, 
and the response time (RT) is determined by the time it takes to reach this bound plus 
additional non-decision time. This idea of sequential sampling and accumulation was 
probably introduced to psychology by Stone (1960) who based his idea on pioneering work 
by Wald (1947) using the so-called sequential probability ratio test. The most successful 
behavioral models can be separated into two classes (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004): random 
walk models (Figure 2A, Laming, 1968; Link and Heath, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978) and 




Figure 2. The two dominant sequential sampling models of perceptual decision-making. Both 
models assume that noisy sensory evidence is accumulated across time until a threshold is 
reached (dashed line) at which a choice is made and a response can be executed. (A) Random 
walk models assume that the difference of evidence at a given point in time is accumulated in a 
single accumulator. The threshold that is reached determines the choice. (B) In accumulator 
models, there is separate evidence accumulation for all alternatives and only one threshold for 
each choice. The most successful versions of these models also include mutual inhibition 
between the accumulators. 
 
Random walk models assume one accumulator and two bounds in the case of two 
response alternatives. As soon as one of the bounds is reached, a response can be 
executed. Evidence is accumulated in terms of the difference between both alternatives, i.e. 
that evidence in favor of one alternative is evidence against the other alternative. One class 
of random walk models is that of drift-diffusion models (Ratcliff, 1978) which have become 
very popular more recently, because they can be used to explain not only behavioral (Ratcliff 
and Smith, 2004), but also neuronal data (Ratcliff et al., 2003) and offer analytical solutions 
which makes problems computationally more tractable. 
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Accumulator models – often also called race models – on the other hand assume one 
accumulator and one bound for each response alternative. Some accumulator models 
assume independence (Vickers, 1970; Townsend and Ashby, 1983) while others incorporate 
mutual inhibition at the level of the sensory evidence (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; 
Mazurek et al., 2003) or at the level of the integration of sensory evidence (Usher and 
McClelland, 2001; Wang, 2002).  
In most cases, both the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) and the leaky 
accumulator model (Usher and McClelland, 2001) perform equally well. This, however, may 
be due to the fact that mathematically accumulator models with inhibition and an optimal 
level of mutual inhibition can be reduced to random walk models (Bogacz, 2007). More 
recently, a third type of model has been developed which has received a lot of interest. This 
has to do with its simplicity and the ability to explain all known patterns of RT and 
performance, with even simpler analytical solutions that can be applied to more than two 
response alternatives: the linear ballistic accumulator model (Brown and Heathcote, 2008). 
However, this model suffers from neuronal implausibility, because the parameters are set 
and fixed at the beginning of the accumulation process which would make additional 
accumulation of evidence unnecessary. The model would also have a hard time 
incorporating non-stationary sources of noise (but see Brown and Heathcote, 2008). 
Is there actually neuronal evidence that decision makers use mechanisms such as 
accumulation of evidence for making their perceptual decisions? In the following sections, we 
highlight important results in the experimental literature, but focus on experiments conducted 
in the visual domain (for a review of other domains, see Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Before 
coming to these results, we provide a brief explanation of some of the behavioral tasks used 




1.4 Tasks used to study neuronal processes underlying perceptual decision-making 
In general, most perceptual decision-making tasks share two features: First, they measure 
either detection (“is there a stimulus?”) or discrimination (“is it stimulus A or stimulus B?”) 
performance using RTs or accuracy, and second they focus mainly on task difficulty levels at 
which subjects perform neither at floor nor at ceiling in both of these measures. We will 
return to the importance of this second point in Chapter 3.1. 
There are various tasks that have been carried out to study perceptual decision-
making (Parker and Newsome, 1998; for a review of studies related to animal and human 
neuroscience, see Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008). In most cases, studies of 
perceptual decision-making have been conducted in the visual domain, probably because 
the visual system is better studied than other sensory modalities. There are, however, a 
number of neuroscientific studies that have been carried out in other perceptual domains, 
most importantly in the tactile (Mountcastle et al., 1990; Hernández et al., 2000; Romo et al., 
2004; Pleger et al., 2006), more rarely in the olfactory (Uchida and Mainen, 2003; Bowman et 
al., 2012) and the auditory modalities (Binder et al., 2004; Kaiser et al., 2007), or other 
sensory pathways such as pain (Wiech et al., 2010). However, since all experiments in this 
dissertation were visual experiments, we will not discuss other modalities further. 
In the visual domain, the neuroscience of decision-making has also seen a number of 
different approaches. These approaches include detection and discrimination tasks and vary 
from the level of contrast discrimination (Barlow et al., 1987) and perceptual acuity (Parker 
and Hawken, 1987) via very simple visual stimuli such as gratings (Bradley et al., 1987; 
Kahnt et al., 2011) to more complex stimuli such as faces and houses (Heekeren et al., 
2004; Afraz et al., 2006; McKeeff and Tong, 2007). The probably most commonly employed 
stimulus is a motion stimulus called random dot motion (RDM) kinematogram. 
In the RDM task, subjects observe a cloud of moving dots and need to detect or 
report the direction of coherent motion. Between two consecutive frames, only a small 
percentage of dots move in the target direction, typically at a fixed speed, while motion of all 
other dots acts as noise. In many versions of the RDM task, target dots change randomly 
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from one frame to another to prevent detection of coherent motion through only a small 
number of dots (for review and comparison of methods, see Scase et al., 1996; Pilly and 
Seitz, 2009). The most common movement of all noise dots is movement in random 
directions fixed across time (“direction noise”), movement in random directions varying 
across time (“Brownian noise”) or movement with positional displacement which is identical 
to both random directions and random speed varying across time (“white noise”, Britten et 
al., 1992). In addition, there are combinations of these displacement methods where each 
dot receives a limited lifetime, and interleaved sequences in which displacements happen 
across multiple frames, rather than between two successive frames (Shadlen and Newsome, 
2001). 
The amount of signal, i.e. how strong the target motion direction is represented in the 
stimulus, is typically defined as the percentage of dots moving in the same direction and is 
termed the motion coherence. The RDM stimulus has become quite popular among vision 
scientists and researchers interested in investigating the neuronal mechanisms subserving 
motion perception (Britten et al., 1992), perceptual decision-making (Shadlen and Newsome, 
2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002), and perceptual learning (Ball and Sekuler, 1982; 
Watanabe et al., 2002). One of the reasons for this popularity stems from the ease of 
manipulating the difficulty of the stimulus to achieve very small differences in performance 
around the perceptual threshold. Another aspect that is particularly important for researchers 
investigating the time-course of perceptual decision-making in sequential sampling models is 
the necessity to observe the stimulus for longer periods of time in order to perceive the target 
motion, which in other stimuli might be more difficult to manipulate. Finally, within the visual 
system motion is a perceptual feature that has been particularly well characterized at the 




1.5 The neuronal representation of sensory evidence  
First discussed in Presocratic philosophy (von Glasersfeld, 1996), and formalized through the 
advent of psychophysics (Gescheider, 1997), it is today widely accepted that there is no 
direct relationship between visual stimuli in the outside world and our visual perception, i.e. 
that the neuronal firing patterns do not faithfully represent the world as such. The evidence 
that is used to guide our perceptual choices, therefore, is sensory evidence, i.e. evidence 
stemming from our senses, and is the product of neuronal signals that have been filtered and 
multiplexed with other neurons from the level of receptors to neurons in higher levels of the 
cerebral cortex. A great deal of interest has been invested into understanding the level at 
which neuronal responses no longer follow the “true” physical stimulus and match the way in 
which the stimulus is perceived. Two parallel streams of research have evolved investigating 
this question: One is more closely related to the properties of single neurons or neuronal 
populations (Parker and Newsome, 1998), uses methods from psychophysical and signal 
detection theory traditions (Green and Swets, 1966; Britten et al., 1992), and is mostly 
interested in understanding the neuronal processes governing behavioral choices of 
observers. The other stream investigates these neuronal processes in terms of 
“consciousness” (Crick and Koch, 1990; Rees et al., 2002) and involves more generally the 
processes minimally sufficient for a person to be conscious. In the latter approach it is, 
however, often (mistakenly) assumed that processes related to the perceived stimulus are 
processes directly involved in consciousness.3 This tradition focuses less on the behavioral 
choices of subjects, but more on the aspect of subjective perception which in terms of signal 
detection theory can differ from behavioral choices depending on the response bias 
(Kanwisher, 2001). 
3 From a theoretical point of view, the relationship between how the stimulus is perceived and 
neuronal response patterns following this percept can be seen a necessary, but not as a sufficient 
requirement for consciousness. This is empirically supported by studies demonstrating correlations 
between perceptual decisions and neuronal responses averaged across many trials. In these studies, 
behavioral and neuronal data were acquired in different sessions and neuronal measurements were 
recorded under anesthesia, therefore demonstrating correlations of perception and neuronal activity 
without consciousness (Tolhurst et al., 1983; see e.g. Bradley et al., 1987). 
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 Within the former tradition, from the early 1980’s there have been multiple attempts to 
describe a link between the perceiver’s sensitivity on the one side, and the neuronal 
sensitivity on the other side (for early attempts, see Parker and Hawken, 1985; Bradley et al., 
1987; Barlow et al., 1987). The first direct link between monkey electrophysiology and 
psychophysics was achieved with concurrent measurements in both modalities (Newsome et 
al., 1989; Britten et al., 1992), an approach which was later extended to human observers 
and fMRI (Ress et al., 2000; Ress and Heeger, 2003). Newsome and colleagues (1989) 
demonstrated a close match psychophysical performance of macaque monkeys with firing 
rates of individual neurons in the middle temporal area (MT) – a region known for its strong 
selectivity for motion direction (Dubner and Zeki, 1971; Zeki, 1974; Born and Bradley, 2005). 
This means that monitoring a very small number of neurons in area MT would be sufficient to 
carry out the perceptual task, supported by studies applying microstimulation to area MT 
(Ditterich et al., 2003). However, it later became clear that this original claim only held for the 
average firing rate and could barely explain trial-by-trial variability in performance (Britten et 
al., 1996). In other words, the choice probability, i.e. the sensitivity of a single neuron in 
discriminating between choices given a particular stimulus, was rather low.4 Therefore, a 
direct read-out of activity from individual neurons in area MT was not seen as sufficient to 
explain psychophysical performance (Shadlen et al., 1996).5 Instead, other brain regions 
were targeted to investigate the pooling and integration of opposing motion directions. 
 
4 More precisely, choice probability refers to accuracy of an ideal observer to indicate the choice on a 
given trial by using the neuronal response. 
5 More recently, this discrepancy between extraordinarily high sensitivity of individual neurons – often 
higher than that of the observer – and very low choice probabilities was explained by two 
shortcomings of the original studies: (a) long viewing durations in the original studies, probably not 
mirroring the use of information of the monkey (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002), and (b) wrong 
assumptions about noise correlations between neurons with opposite preferred directions in area MT 




                                                          
1.6 Neuronal evidence for evidence-accumulation mechanisms in the macaque 
monkey 
A primary candidate for an integrator region was the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) which lies 
midway in the hierarchy between area MT encoding sensory evidence and motor regions 
such as the frontal eye field and the superior colliculus that directly participate in eye 
movement responses (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). Today, there is good evidence that for 
eye-movement tasks, area LIP not only accumulates sensory evidence, but closely tracks the 
formation of the decision, in other words carries a time-varying representation of a perceptual 
decision variable (DV, Gold and Shadlen, 2007). In decision-making tasks, LIP neurons are 
selected based on their response in a memory-guided saccade task (Colby et al., 1996). 
Typically, a visual target stimulus (e.g. a colored disk) is placed into the receptive field (RF) 
of a neuron, and neuronal responses are measured to this stimulus. This means that 
increases in firing rates to the stimulus reflect increased processing of the target stimulus, 
which can be used as an index of sensory evidence accumulation. There are numerous 
studies together implicating that the region might carry a perceptual DV (Shadlen and 
Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Hanks et al., 2006; Churchland et al., 2008; 
Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Bollimunta et al., 2012). They also strongly support the drift-
diffusion model of perceptual decision-making (Ratcliff, 1978; Mazurek et al., 2003): 
 
(a) When the eye-movement target which indicates the chosen direction of motion lies in 
the RF, neuronal firing rates increase, but they don’t change or even decrease when 
the chosen target is not in the RF, demonstrating a choice-related response (Shadlen 
and Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008; Kiani and 
Shadlen, 2009; Bollimunta et al., 2012). 
(b) Rather than showing constant firing rates across time as is the case for area MT, the 
neuronal firing rates increase steadily with time, in line with a summation response 
(Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008; 
Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Bollimunta et al., 2012). 
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(c) The neuronal firing rates vary systematically with choice difficulty as expected from a 
time-evolving DV (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; 
Churchland et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). 
(d) The firing rates predict monkeys’ choices independent of whether the response was 
correct or incorrect (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; 
Churchland et al., 2008). 
(e) In contrast to area MT, the choice probabilities of individual neurons in LIP even for 
0% coherence are very high, evolve over time and vary systematically with choice 
difficulty (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). 
(f) Variability in saccadic response properties (e.g. speed of saccade) are not explained 
by firing rates in LIP, arguing against a representation of the motor-response itself 
(Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; however, LIP could still convey a coarser motor 
signal, but see below). 
(g) LIP activity increases and remains high until a response is made, at which point 
activity decays rapidly, indicating that the DV is only maintained until a response is 
made (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). 
(h) When monkeys are allowed to respond as soon as they have accumulated enough 
evidence (RT version of the task), the relationships in (a) to (e) hold, demonstrating 
that the LIP response is not merely a consequence of the decision that has been 
formed earlier in time and has been computed elsewhere (Roitman and Shadlen, 
2002; Churchland et al., 2008). 
(i) LIP activity in the RT version of the task increases until a threshold, at which an eye-
movement response is executed. Same as (g) this indicates that the DV is maintained 
until a response is made (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008; 
Bollimunta et al., 2012). 
(j) Microstimulation of area LIP biases choices towards the RF of stimulated neurons, 
demonstrating that LIP responses are causally involved in the decision-making 
process (Hanks et al., 2006). 
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(k) Microstimulation of area LIP never directly evokes saccades, i.e. LIP activity is not 
merely motor-related (Hanks et al., 2006). 
(l) The firing rates increase faster when the monkey responds sooner, in line with faster 
accumulation of evidence on trials with shorter RT (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). 
(m) More alternatives for decision-making are reflected in lower initial firing rates, in line 
with a lower starting point of evidence accumulation (Churchland et al., 2008). 
(n) When the monkey is given the opportunity to opt-out when it is unsure, the responses 
of LIP neurons are lower, in agreement with a graded representation of the DV (Kiani 
and Shadlen, 2009). 
(o) When recording concurrently from multiple units in area LIP, the gradual increase in 
firing rates holds for individual trials, demonstrating that previous findings that report 
averaged responses over many trials are not a confound of this averaging procedure 
(Bollimunta et al., 2012).  
 
Neuronal responses in other brain regions have been shown to carry activity consistent with 
a DV, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; dlPFC, Hussar 
and Pasternak, 2013), the frontal eye field (Gold and Shadlen, 2000, 2003), and the superior 
colliculus (Horwitz and Newsome, 1999, 2001). However, less is known about the capacity of 
these brain regions to represent a DV. For example, microstimulation of both the superior 
colliculus and the frontal eye field evoke saccades (Schiller and Stryker, 1972; Bruce et al., 
1985), but this does not necessarily affect these regions’ capacity for representing a DV in a 
saccade task. 
Other than only being related to eye-movements, area LIP has been found to be 
active in a number of tasks related to top-down attention (Colby et al., 1996), attentional 
salience (Gottlieb et al., 1998; Bisley and Goldberg, 2003), working memory (Gnadt and 
Andersen, 1988), relative action probabilities (Yang and Shadlen, 2007), intention (Bracewell 
et al., 1996; Mazzoni et al., 1996), and expected value (Platt and Glimcher, 1999). One 
underlying principle of LIP function could be the selection of an eye-movement target (Gold 
15 
 
and Shadlen, 2007), i.e. that area LIP codes for the behavioral relevance of a particular 
spatial location. More recent work suggests a more flexible role of this region (e.g. Freedman 
and Assad, 2006), in that it is involved in multiple independent computations, even within the 
same neuron (Bennur and Gold, 2011). Interestingly, the idea that an area which implements 
target-selection is also recruited to accumulate evidence does not necessitate a central 
decision maker that relays the outcome of a decision to other brain regions. In other words, 
LIP activity could reflect an embodied version of a decision, where the decision for a specific 
motion direction in the RDM task might be identical to the choice of the eye-movement target 
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Shadlen et al., 2008; Freedman and Assad, 2011). 
So far, we did not discuss aspects of decision-making other than accumulation of 
evidence, and how they may be implemented in the macaque brain. For example, a general 
bias for one over the other option could be represented as a selective shift of the response 
criterion for the biased option, but also as a shift of the firing rate. Indeed, recent results 
indicate that changes in response criterion are signaled by changes in the firing rate of 
neurons in LIP (Rao et al., 2012; Rorie et al., 2010; see Platt and Glimcher, 1999, for earlier 
evidence), probably originating in caudate nucleus of the basal ganglia (Ding and Gold, 
2010, 2012). The speed-accuracy tradeoff could be realized by a lowered threshold for 
responding or by generally increased firing rates of all response-selective populations of 
neurons which are equivalent in most models of perceptual decision-making (Bogacz et al., 
2010). Other possibilities encompass non-linear changes in firing rate when evidence in favor 
of one response alternative increases (Hanks et al., 2011), or a modulation of the weight of 
evidence by an urgency signal (Cisek et al., 2009). In fact, the story might be more 
complicated, with recent evidence indicating both increases in baseline firing as well as 
increases in the rate of evidence accumulation, but no change in threshold (Heitz and Schall, 
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2012).6 Another origin of the speed-accuracy tradeoff has been suggested to lie in the basal 
ganglia (Bogacz et al., 2010). 
 Taken together, there is good evidence from the literature of monkey 
electrophysiology that perceptual decisions are carried out by accumulating sensory 
evidence until a threshold at which a response is executed, and when immediate responses 
are not possible the accumulated evidence is maintained in the same region. For oculomotor 
responses, such signals have been reported in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, superior 
colliculus, the frontal eye field, and area LIP, the last of which lies between sensory and 
motor regions and is seen as a good candidate for representing perceptual decisions. 
Although the existence of this decision-making mechanism is not disputed, the 
implementation is still a matter of debate: While all of these brain regions show activity 
consistent with continuous accumulation, it is still unclear if any of these regions alone 
performs the summation response, if other regions carry out this computation, or even if 
evidence accumulation is a neuronally more distributed process (Gold and Shadlen, 2007).  
1.7. Questions in the study of perceptual decision-making left open by monkey 
electrophysiology 
Although many important questions about perceptual decision-making have been addressed 
by electrophysiology experiments with macaque monkeys, several questions remain. First, 
do the mechanisms found in macaques generalize to human observers? For example, would 
we find similar responses in a human homologue of monkey area LIP which has been 
suggested to be posterior intraparietal sulcus (Silver and Kastner, 2009)? It is unlikely that 
there is a strict mapping between macaque and human parietal cortex, given differences in 
anatomy (e.g. size, structure and connectivity), as well as function (Orban et al., 2004; 
Grefkes and Fink, 2005; Culham et al., 2006). For example, the commonly observed 
6 The increased drift rate suggests that in such cases observers are able to more accurately 
accumulate sensory evidence, i.e. they can better suppress sources of noise. Indeed, Heitz and Schall 
(2012) provide evidence that already sensory processing is affected by speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
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attentional deficit in humans termed visuospatial neglect cannot be found in macaque 
monkeys with lesions to the parietal cortex (Husain and Nachev, 2007). 
Second, how strong is the influence of behavioral training on these neuronal 
response patterns? Monkeys are typically trained extensively for weeks to months to perform 
a perceptual decision-making task, and it has been shown that the repeated coupling of 
specific percepts with specific motor-responses (e.g. “always make saccade to right target 
when motion direction is to the right”) can lead to changes in the neuronal response 
properties of the superior colliculus (Horwitz et al., 2004). Whether the idea of “embodied 
cognition” as exemplified in oculomotor regions of LIP extends to less trained observers is 
left largely open by the animal literature. 
 Third, although there is strong evidence for the suggested regions in participating in 
perceptual decision-making, it is unclear if perceptual decisions are generated in these 
regions or if the neuronal firing patterns in these regions reflect only the consequence of a 
decision-making signal generated elsewhere in the brain. Even studies demonstrating that 
microstimulation of a particular brain region leads to changes in decision-making cannot 
provide a sufficient answer to this question. It has been shown that when neurons in a region 
– e.g. LIP – are stimulated for the entire viewing period of a stimulus, then there is a bias 
towards making a saccade to the RF of the stimulated neuron that indicates a choice towards 
that location (Hanks et al., 2006). This could mean one of three things: Either neuronal 
responses from area MT are pooled and summed up in area LIP, i.e. as suggested by most 
monkey electrophysiology studies evidence to execute a saccade is accumulated in this 
region; then stimulation would cause a bias of evidence towards the stimulated RF. 
Alternatively, area LIP might be coding the selection of an eye-movement response alone, 
and provided with specific input for a hypothetical decision-making region, the 
microstimulation-induced elevated firing rate would more readily lead to the generation of a 
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saccade even though the monkey’s choice would not have been determined yet.7 Another 
possibility is that activity in LIP might be tied to the particular type of decision made, but there 
may still be a more general decision-making module somewhere else in the brain. 
Fourth, and related to the previous argument: Which brain regions participate in 
perceptual decision-making when decisions are not carried out with saccadic responses? Are 
there more general decision-making mechanisms that possibly also generalize across 
modality? Evidence from a vibrotactile discrimination task in which monkeys reported their 
choice with a button-press indicates that the ventral premotor cortex can be involved in 
computing the DV (Romo et al., 2004), but to date no monkey electrophysiology study looked 
at whether the DV could be represented independent of the response effector. 
 The use of neuroimaging techniques in humans might help providing answers to 
these questions. While neuroimaging suffers from lower spatial or temporal resolution than 
single-cell recordings, one advantage lies in the possibility to measure activity from all 
regions of the brain at the same time which could help identifying candidates for perceptual 
decision-making related brain regions. In addition, training in human observers can be done 
within minutes to hours and more complicated task designs are possible, while training even 
for simple designs in monkeys usually lasts weeks to months, bringing with it the above-
mentioned problems of structural changes that might conceal the patterns of decision-making 
related brain activity present under normal viewing conditions (Horwitz et al., 2004). 
 
1.8 Evidence for perceptual decision-making from human functional neuroimaging and 
electrophysiology 
One of the first pieces of neuronal evidence for perceptual decision-making in humans came 
from a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study using a face-house 
7 These scenarios could potentially be distinguished by LIP microstimulation that happens only for 
brief periods of time at the beginning of the trial which – if LIP really sums up responses over time – 
should induce the same sort of bias, but if LIP coded only the outcome of the decision, the elevated 
firing rates should decrease again. However, the effects found in the previous study (Hanks et al., 
2006) were indeed not very large which would under temporary stimulation make it even less likely to 
find such an effect. 
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discrimination task (Heekeren et al., 2004). FMRI suffers from a much lower temporal and 
spatial resolution than single cell recordings which makes it difficult to observe the same sort 
of evidence as reported in monkey electrophysiology work which mainly relies on the 
temporal evolution of the signal (Chapter 1.6). This issue is explained and dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
One marker of evidence accumulation that might also be found in fMRI studies would 
be an increased blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal for easier decisions, since 
accumulated evidence is expected to remain at a high level until a response is made, and the 
response threshold should be reached earlier when accumulation happens faster. The 
authors used a second marker by applying the following reasoning: Sensory evidence for 
faces should be represented in the face-selective region termed fusiform face area (FFA, 
Kanwisher et al., 1997), while evidence for houses should be represented in the place-
selective region termed parahippocampal place area (PPA, Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). If 
evidence is accumulated by a drift-diffusion-like process as explained above (Chapter 1.3), 
then neuronal populations carrying out such a process should represent the sum of the 
difference of the signals in FFA and PPA, and assuming that roughly the same number of 
neurons respond to face evidence than to house evidence, the absolute difference of both 
FFA and PPA signals is most informative.8 The authors reported that both of these criteria – 
stronger responses to higher evidence and were fulfilled by left dlPFC and that activity in this 
region also predicted behavioral performance of subjects. However, given that the difficulty of 
decisions is correlated with the absolute difference of signals in FFA and PPA, it is unclear if 
the signal in dlPFC reflects decision-making as such or merely processes related to task 
difficulty (Tosoni et al., 2008). This problem is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 2. 
The investigation of decision-making mechanisms has since seen a remarkable rise 
with a large variability of approaches. An in-depth review of all these studies and the applied 
8 In fact, the authors only used the difference of the signal in FFA and PPA, not the sum of the 
difference. However, given the sluggishness of the BOLD response and the short viewing times of 




                                                          
methods is beyond the scope of this dissertation (for a review of human decision-making 
studies in general, see Heekeren et al., 2008; for a review of studies on the speed-accuracy 
trade-off, see Bogacz et al., 2010). In Chapter 2 we will discuss some of these approaches 
and their limitations, and suggest possible solutions to some of these limiting factors. 
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2. How to identify perceptual decision-making related brain 
signals with fMRI in humans 
 
Monkey electrophysiology research has laid the basis for the investigation of the neuronal 
mechanisms underlying perceptual decision-making. It provided strong evidence that 
decisions are formed by continuously accumulating sensory evidence over time until a 
threshold is reached at which time a response can be executed (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). 
While the existence of this mechanism in the brain is largely undisputed, its generality in 
perceptual decision-making has been called into question (Uchida et al., 2006; Gold and 
Shadlen, 2007), and it still remains unclear which brain regions carry out the process of 
accumulating sensory evidence and represent a decision variable (DV). A strong research 
focus lies on the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of the macaque monkey (Shadlen and 
Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Hanks et al., 2006; Churchland et al., 2008; 
Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Bollimunta et al., 2012), but as pointed out above, current evidence 
is not conclusive regarding the generality of the involvement of this brain region in perceptual 
decision-making, i.e. whether evidence accumulation takes place in LIP only when eye-
movement responses are carried out. This question might be addressed by clever future 
electrophysiology experiments. Current experimental evidence can show only the 
participation of this region in oculomotor decision-making, not whether the accumulation 
process itself takes place in this region. This would require the concurrent monitoring of 
activity of multiple candidate brain regions that are possibly unknown to the monkey 
electrophysiologist. In addition, it is unclear if the suggested homologies of brain regions 
between macaques and humans hold (Orban et al., 2004; Grefkes and Fink, 2005; Culham 
et al., 2006), which necessitates direct observations of human decision behavior. Human 
neuroimaging experiments have the potential to identify these candidate brain regions that 
may participate in perceptual decision-making and additionally offer the possibility to 
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investigate interactions between brain activity patterns in several brain regions at the same 
time, which together might provide a more complete picture of the decision-making process. 
 
2.1. Inference and the link between neuronal responses and cognitive processes 
Monkey electrophysiology and human neuroimaging are similar in their general approach of 
linking decision-making behavior to neuronal responses (Figure 3): They try to infer the 
cognitive process of interest (e.g. evidence accumulation) from neuronal and behavioral 
data, in that way demonstrate both the fact that the brain carries out this process and where 
it is carried out, which should enlighten us how the process is realized in the brain. This 
inference is not trivial, because multiple cognitive processes are present at a given time. For 
that reason, it is necessary to search for behavioral and neuronal effects that can only be 
explained by the suggested cognitive mechanism, or at least where alternative explanations 
are much less plausible (for a discussion of this topic, see Sarter et al., 1996; Poldrack, 
2006). This general strategy can also be described as identifying one or several neuronal 
markers that agree or disagree with the assumed cognitive process. The reasoning is that if 
a marker agrees with the assumed cognitive process, but partially or fully disagrees with all 
alternative explanations, then the inference that the measured neuronal activity participates 
in the cognitive process is likely to be true. The more markers agree with the cognitive 
process and disagree with other processes, the larger the likelihood of the inference being 
correct.9 
9 The difficulty lies in the fact that one or several markers needs to disagree with all other cognitive 
processes which cannot easily be shown, in particular not in a small set of experiments. 
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Figure 3 The inferential process in perceptual decision-making tasks. The researcher may aim 
at identifying the neuronal processes underlying the accumulation of sensory evidence. Based 
on the behavioral responses of a subject and the related neuronal responses in a particular 
brain region, this mechanism is assumed to be represented in a particular brain region. The 
inference can, however, only be made if all other cognitive processes that happen at the same 
time interval cannot explain the neuronal and behavioral response pattern. 
 
2.2 The different levels of description for decision-related neuronal processes 
A crucial distinction to be made at this point is about different levels at which decision-related 
neuronal processes can be described, something that may often be confused if not spelled 
out explicitly (Figure 4). Here, the distinction is made between four levels of description: 
decision-related, decision-relevant, decision-specific, and decision-implementing neuronal 
processes. The description is hierarchical, i.e. decision-implementing neuronal processes are 
a subset of decision-specific processes, and decision-specific processes are a subset of 
decision-relevant processes, etc. 
Decision-related neuronal processes are all those processes that generally 
participate in the decision-making process. They show changes in their response when a 
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decision is carried out, and their manipulation can have an influence on the dynamics of the 
decision. An example for processes that would only qualify as being decision-related are 
attentional processes that could have an impact on the decision-making process, but which 
are not strictly necessary for decision-making. Decision-relevant processes are similar to 
decision-related processes, but they are indeed crucially involved in the decision, i.e. they 
are relevant for a decision and without them a decision could not be executed. For example, 
the representation of sensory evidence and the motor response initiation are critical parts of 
a decision-making process, but neither require that a perceptual decision is carried out at the 
same time. That means the presence of these processes is not sufficient for the presence of 
decision-making.10 Decision-specific processes are those processes that carry a DV, i.e. they 
can be used to predict the choice of a subject on any given trial; also without these 
processes a decision could not be carried out. Any brain region representing a DV would 
qualify as decision-specific. Finally, decision-implementing processes are those processes 
that are critically involved in the creation of a DV, i.e. they carry out the transformation 
process of other cognitive variables into a DV. 
 
The distinction between decision-related and decision-relevant is somewhat vague, 
because some attentional processes are of course necessary for the execution of a decision. 
However, they can also be seen as an enabling factor for the existence of decision-relevant, 
10 As a side remark, if the DV was represented in an embodied manner (Shadlen et al., 2008), i.e. if 
making a decision was implemented in a motor planning scheme, then the presence of motor planning 
would indicate that a decision is being made. 
Figure 4 A taxonomy of decision-
related neuronal processes, 
representing different levels of 
description and specificity of the 
relationship between perceptual 
decision-making and neuronal 
response patterns. The more 
specific processes can be seen 




                                                          
decision-specific, and decision-implementing processes. Also the border of decision-relevant 
and decision-specific is soft, because for a given task and a given motor response the DV 
might be mirrored only in regions of the saccadic system, whereas in the same task with a 
different motor response the DV might only be reflected in regions of the grasping system. In 
that case, decision-implementing processes would be identical to decision-specific neuronal 
processes. Although these borders might be soft, we believe the taxonomy is useful for a 
clearer description of neuronal processes underlying perceptual decision-making. 
How far are we in the description of these processes? In the next two sections, 
neuronal markers of monkey electrophysiology and human neuroimaging are compared. As 
we will see, neither method has clearly reached the highest level of description, but human 
neuroimaging experiments are at the moment much less advanced than monkey 
electrophysiology. We will propose that some of these limitations in human neuroimaging can 
be avoided by the use of multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA, Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes 
and Rees, 2006), offering an avenue to bridge the gap between the description of these 
processes across species. 
 
2.3. Decision-related brain signals in monkey electrophysiology 
Neuronal markers of decision-related processes have been reported in a number of monkey 
electrophysiology experiments. A now classical example is the choice probability introduced 
by Britten, Newsome and colleagues (Britten et al., 1996) which denotes the ability of a 
single neuron to discriminate between the choices of a subject given a particular stimulus 
(see Chapter 1.5). The choice probabilities found in motion-sensitive area MT were generally 
quite low (Purushothaman and Bradley, 2004; see also Cohen and Newsome, 2009), 
disqualifying single neurons of area MT as the neuronal site at which decisions are 
implemented. Even if choice probabilities were high in populations of MT neurons, they are 
typically calculated across the entire viewing window. This summing mimics the process of 
evidence accumulation, and if any would provide evidence for MT as carrying the sensory 
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evidence that might be integrated somewhere else. This still means that activity in area MT is 
decision-relevant, but not that it is decision-specific. 
Other examples for such “neuronal markers” in monkey electrophysiology studies 
have been provided by Shadlen and colleagues for area LIP, but also for the frontal eye field 
and the superior colliculus (for references and their discussion, see Chapter 1.6). Most of 
these pieces of evidence rely on the high spatial and temporal resolution of single-cell 
recordings. Neurons are typically selected based on their response properties, for example 
their response in a memory-guided saccade task (Colby et al., 1996). Typically the eye-
movement target is then placed in the receptive field of the neuron (Shadlen and Newsome, 
2001). Both the average firing rate as well as the time-course can be used to predict when 
the monkey is going to make a decision. 
The processes described in these experiments qualify as decision-specific, because 
they carry a specific representation of a DV. This already is quite a remarkable achievement, 
with many pieces of evidence corroborating the existence of a DV in LIP (see the list in 
Chapter 1.6). However, what could not be demonstrated was that these processes were 
decision-implementing, because a DV could be formed somewhere else in the brain and fed 
into area LIP as a signal coding response selection or other cognitive processes. Indeed, 
with the current methodology available to monkey electrophysiologists, it would be quite 
demanding to demonstrate decision-implementing processes. After having identified and 
recorded from all brain regions that carry a DV, it would have to be shown that this particular 
region is the first to carry the representation of a DV (“first implementation”), or that it is not 
influenced by other brain regions carrying a DV earlier in time (“independent 
implementation”).11 Since these regions are unknown a priori, the use of neuroimaging could 
complement the identification of candidate regions for the representation of the DV, and the 
11 To complicate the issue, a causal link to behavior would have to be demonstrated, too. Unlikely as it 
may be, the existence of a DV somewhere in the brain could be epiphenomenal, i.e. serve no 
purpose. A complete understanding of the decision-implementing neuronal populations would in that 
respect only exist when all steps of neuronal transformation from stimulus representation to execution 
of the decision are understood. 
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connectivity profile between these regions could serve as an index for their causal 
relationship. 
 
2.4. The problem of identifying decision-related brain signals with human 
neuroimaging 
Finding neuronal markers is in some way much more difficult in experiments employing 
functional neuroimaging rather than monkey electrophysiology, which has to do with the 
much lower specificity of the signal that is investigated. Although the first step of selecting 
relevant neurons with the desired response properties is avoided in functional neuroimaging 
studies that can acquire signals from many locations of the brain at the same time, there are 
two major disadvantages of this technique: the much lower temporal resolution in the range 
of seconds rather than milliseconds, and the much lower spatial resolution in the range of 
hundreds of thousands of neurons rather than individual neurons. Both of these problems 
lead to this low specificity of the signal investigated and make the inferential problem – the 
problem of finding neuronal markers of decision-related processes – much more demanding. 
The low temporal resolution leads to two problems: First, it is difficult to attribute a 
specific brain signal to a given time point of the decision, which makes it more difficult to 
distinguish decision-specific processes from decision-unspecific processes. The DV could 
possibly be disambiguated from other non-specific brain signals by tracking the evolution of 
this signal in time and matching it to the time-point of the choice, but this would require a 
much higher temporal resolution not possible with BOLD fMRI. Second, BOLD fMRI cannot 
easily distinguish constant neuronal responses, e.g. those representing sensory evidence, 
from time-varying responses, e.g. those reflecting the DV. This is because the BOLD 
response can be described as a convolution of the underlying neuronal signals with a slow 
hemodynamic response function. This convolution mimics an averaging or summing of 
neuronal responses over time and reduces or eliminates the difference between steady vs. 
increasing neuronal responses. Non-invasive electrophysiological techniques with higher 
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temporal resolution – electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetencephalography (MEG) – 
are on the other hand even more limited in their spatial resolution, and the measured brain 
signals often consist of a spatial mixture of many different processes occurring 
simultaneously in many different brain regions (for different “unmixing” approaches, see 
Philiastides et al., 2006; Donner et al., 2009). 
The low spatial resolution of fMRI – albeit higher than that of EEG or MEG – leads to 
two additional problems: First, within a given voxel the signals representing the DV for 
opposing alternatives might cancel each other out: According to a drift-diffusion process, 
some neuronal populations responsive to a particular choice alternative would show an 
increase in activity with evidence for this alternative, while the populations coding the other 
alternative would show a decrease. This can lead to an overall null-response in the voxel, but 
in case of asymmetric responses or asymmetries in the number of choice-selective neurons 
in that voxel to an overall increase or decrease in the measured response. Second, many 
other processes that are not decision-specific are present around the time of the decision 
and will more easily be confused with decision-specific processes. They might be decision-
related, for example attentional processes that aid the decision-making process, but could 
also be unrelated processes that co-occur in time, such as processes related to the motor 
response itself. Decision-relevant, decision-specific or decision-implementing processes are 
in turn even more difficult to demonstrate, because the measured response can hardly be 
used to predict the choice of the subject. 
 
2.5. Previous approaches to identifying decision-related brain signals with human 
fMRI  
The difficulties described above have been approached in a number of clever experiments in 
the attempt to identify neuronal markers of decision-specific processes with fMRI. Here we 
provide a selected number of approaches representative of the imaging literature on 
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perceptual decision-making. Some articles reported used several of these criteria to identify 
decision-related signals: 
 
(a) Correlation of BOLD response and stimulus difficulty (Heekeren et al., 2004, 2006; 
Pleger et al., 2006; Tosoni et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2009; Noppeney et al., 2010; 
Kayser et al., 2010a, 2010b; Kovács et al., 2010; Liu and Pleskac, 2011; Erickson 
and Kayser, 2013) 
(b) Correlation of BOLD response and choice reaction time (Binder et al., 2004; 
Thielscher and Pessoa, 2007; McKeeff and Tong, 2007; Noppeney et al., 2010; Ruff 
et al., 2010; Kayser et al., 2010a) 
(c) Correlation of BOLD response and performance (Lewandowska et al., 2010; Kayser 
et al., 2010a) 
(d) Overall positive BOLD response during task execution (Tosoni et al., 2008; Ho et al., 
2009; Kayser et al., 2010a, 2010b; Erickson and Kayser, 2013; Filimon et al., 2013) 
(e) Choice probabilities from BOLD response (Pessoa and Padmala, 2005, 2007) 
(f) Gradual BOLD increase in slow decision-making task (Ploran et al., 2007, 2011) 
(g) Comparison of BOLD signal with predicted signal from cognitive models (Ho et al., 
2009; Domenech and Dreher, 2010) 
(h) Choice-predictive brain signals using MVPA (Pessoa and Padmala, 2007; Serences 
and Boynton, 2007; Li et al., 2009; Hebart et al., 2012) 
 
Of all these approaches, the correlation of BOLD response and stimulus difficulty is the most 
common and also often the primary indicator of a decision-related brain signal, rather than 
for example an overall positive BOLD response which is often used as an additional criterion. 
Each of these approaches should reveal brain regions in which the BOLD response is 
consistent with the representation of a DV. However, are they sufficient to make the 
inference that indeed a region representing the accumulation of evidence was found, as 
depicted in Figure 3? Or are they unable to reduce the number of possible alternative 
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explanations to a sufficient degree? For example, the correlation of BOLD response with RT 
alone could also indicate regions reflecting top-down attention, response selection, response 
conflict, categorization uncertainty or the motor response itself (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; 
Pessoa et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Grinband et al., 2006). Regions correlating 
with performance alone could also reflect stimulus-processing, representation of sensory 
evidence, or top-down attention. Since accuracy and RT are often correlated, each approach 
alone will probably fail to even narrow down the possible candidates. But even the 
combination of most approaches will at most help finding decision-related brain signals rather 
than the more specific signals reflecting the DV.  
 Not surprisingly, a large number of brain regions have been identified as being 
decision-related, mainly in the posterior parietal and the frontal lobes as well as the insular 
cortex. While it is possible that much of the brain is devoted to the accumulation of sensory 
evidence, together the level of specificity of these finding is quite low. In addition – as we will 
see – these findings can also reveal conflicting results. 
 
2.6 An example approach: Correlations between the BOLD response and stimulus 
difficulty 
We will illustrate the problem of finding decision-specific signals using the most common 
approach: the correlation of stimulus difficulty and BOLD signal amplitude. According to an 
evidence accumulation framework (Ratcliff, 1978; Usher and McClelland, 2001) and 
assuming an asymmetry of responses with stronger responses to positive evidence (Chapter 
2.4), the average neuronal signal in an accumulator region at a given point in time should 
increase with an increasing amount of sensory evidence available to the observer (Figure 5 
left). In other words, the more sensory evidence is available, the larger the slope of the 
accumulated evidence and the faster the accumulation threshold is reached. This time 
course of the neuronal signal is not observed directly, but is reflected in the measured BOLD 
signal amplitude. Due to the slow temporal unfolding of this signal, the BOLD response will 
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not reflect the neuronal signal at a given time point, but rather the integral of the neuronal 
activity over a period of seconds (in other words the area under the response curve), plotted 
against time (Figure 5 left). This leads to opposite predictions depending on whether the 
experimenter uses an interrogation protocol in which he himself controls the decision time, or 
a free response protocol in which the decision time is controlled by the subject (Bogacz et al., 
2006). 
In the interrogation protocol, the stimulus is presented for a fixed duration, often 
followed by a delay, before the response is prompted. The optimal strategy is to accumulate 
all information until the stimulus is terminated and to maintain this accumulated evidence 
until a response can be executed.12 Since the integral of the accumulated evidence across 
time – which is reflected in the BOLD signal amplitude – increases with the amount of 
accumulated evidence, the BOLD signal is positively related to the average amount of 
sensory evidence available (Figure 5, top right). 
12 Whether evidence is accumulated to a bound as depicted in Figure 5 (Shadlen and Newsome, 
2001; Kiani et al., 2008) or continues to be accumulated does not change this prediction. 
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Figure 5 Predictions of neuronal signal (left) and related BOLD signal amplitude (right), 
depending on the amount of sensory evidence shown and based on the interrogation protocol 
(top) and the free response protocol (bottom). 
 
In the free response protocol, the stimulus duration depends on the RT of the 
observer, because the observer responds as soon as the accumulated evidence has 
reached a hypothetical “decision bound” (Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). For 
higher levels of sensory evidence, the accumulated signal is thus present for a shorter period 
of time. From this follows that the area under the response curve is smaller for faster 
decisions. Counterintuitively, this leads to a BOLD signal that is negatively related to the 
average amount of sensory evidence, or in other words to a decreasing BOLD signal 
amplitude with increases in sensory evidence (Figure 5, bottom right). 
 Indeed, most studies are in agreement with this suggested relationship: They either 
used an interrogation protocol and focused on a positive relationship between sensory 
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evidence and BOLD signal amplitude (Heekeren et al., 2004, 2006; Pleger et al., 2006; 
Tosoni et al., 2008; Kovács et al., 2010); or they employed a free response protocol and 
focused on a negative relationship between the two (Ho et al., 2009; Noppeney et al., 2010; 
Kayser et al., 2010a, 2010b). Two studies were inconsistent with the expected relationship, 
in that they used an interrogation protocol, but focused on a negative relationship. One of 
these studies did not justify this choice (Erickson and Kayser, 2013), while the other 
explained it by the unknown time courses of maintenance of accumulated evidence (Liu and 
Pleskac, 2011); however, this explanation would necessitate a complex time-dependent 
recoding of accumulated evidence into a different format. 
The studies using a positive relationship typically report brain regions as decision-
related that disengage when a task is performed, while the studies using a negative 
relationship typically focused on regions that engage when a task is performed; the regions 
found are also known as task-negative and task-positive networks, respectively (Fox et al., 
2005; Buckner et al., 2008). For the positive relationship, it has already been suggested that 
such brain signals may only reflect a disengagement from this task-negative network (Singh 
and Fawcett, 2008; Tosoni et al., 2008), because most often they lead to a negative overall 
BOLD response. This disengagement may be stronger for more difficult tasks, i.e. where 
sensory evidence is lower, and would lead to a positive relationship between the amount of 
sensory evidence and the BOLD response. The results using a negative relationship could, 
on the other hand, be related to different levels of attention, decision-evaluation, or 
performance monitoring, but also to varying degrees of difficulty in response selection or a 
number of other cognitive processes (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Pessoa et al., 2003; 
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Potentially, these processes may be decision-related because 
they modulate the decision process, but they are not decision-specific because the decision 




2.7 Empirical findings on the correlations between the BOLD response and stimulus 
difficulty 
Together, these studies make an important prediction: If the relationship of stimulus difficulty 
and BOLD signal amplitude is a useful index, then together the results of all studies reporting 
this relationship should indicate candidates for a region more generally involved in decision-
making. Indeed, this would be a quite useful marker, because such a region would show a 
dependence that would be difficult to explain by mechanisms other than evidence 
accumulation. On the other hand, regions that are inconsistent with this idea, i.e. regions that 
show a positive or a negative relationship irrespective of the experimental protocol, could still 
possibly represent the DV. However, this representation would not be generally observable, 
but masked by a different cognitive process that always shows a positive or a negative 
relationship with stimulus difficulty. 
 For the purpose of this comparison, we compiled the peaks of the results of studies 
that reported positive or negative correlations of BOLD signal with sensory evidence. To 
narrow down the focus for better comparability of results, we only included studies using 
unemotional visual stimulation. In addition, we only included studies for which statistics had 
been carried out in MNI space; otherwise we could not relate these studies to another. In 
total, eleven studies were selected (Table 1), some of which did not use the correlation of 
BOLD response and sensory evidence for the definition of decision-related signals (Bankó et 
al., 2011; Hebart et al., 2012), and one which even was not investigating perceptual decision-
making per se (Singh and Fawcett, 2008). Six of these studies were carried out with an 
interrogation protocol (focus on behavioral accuracy), and five studies used a free response 
protocol (focus on both accuracy and RT). We generated maps from the results tables of the 
studies that were specific to the visual task and the variation of stimulus difficulty by plotting 
colored circles at the corresponding locations of the brain, projected to the cortical surface.13 
13 We are grateful to Annalisa Tosoni and Andrew Kayser for sharing with us the exact coordinates 




                                                          

















two manual interrogation 1.0 s no 




two manual / 
saccade (cue-
dependent) 





two manual interrogation 1.0 s no 




two manual / 
saccade 
interrogation 0.30 s no 
Ho et al (2009) dual random dot 
motion (cue-
dependent) 
four manual / 
saccade 
(different runs) 
free response 1.5 s yes 




two manual free response 2.5 s yes (forced) 
Kayser et al 
(2010b) 
random dot 
motion OR color 
proportion (cue-
dependent) 
two manual free response 2.5 s yes (forced) 
Kovács et al 
(2010) 
motion in depth two manual interrogation 6.0 s no 




two manual free response 2.0 s yes (forced) 




two manual free response 0.25 s no 




two manual interrogation 1.5 s no 
 
Table 1 Studies selected for the comparison of BOLD signal correlations across response 
protocols (interrogation vs. free response protocol).  
 
The results of this comparison are shown in Figure 6. In Figure 6A, results are plotted 
separately for positive and negative correlations between BOLD signal amplitude and 
sensory evidence. As can be seen, positive and negative slopes do not overlap, but form 
largely separate clusters. Clusters for positive slopes can loosely be grouped around the left 
superior frontal sulcus, the left angular gyrus, the precuneus, and possibly around the medial 
prefrontal cortex. For negative slopes, such clusters can be identified around the 
supplementary motor area, the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, inferior frontal gyrus, 
premotor cortex, intraparietal sulcus, visual cortex, and thalamus. The absence of any 
overlap in these clusters means that among the studies selected for this comparison, there 
was no region in which the correlation reversed depending on the task protocol. These 
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results do not support the assumption that increases or decreases in BOLD signal with 
sensory evidence can be used to indicate accumulation of sensory evidence. 
 Figure 6B shows the same peaks, but this time sorted depending on whether results 
would be consistent or inconsistent with the assumption that a positive slope reflects 
accumulation in tasks with an interrogation protocol and that a negative slope reflects 
accumulation in tasks with a free response protocol. Following this logic, a correlation of 
sensory evidence with the BOLD signal amplitude should not be used unambiguously to 
indicate evidence accumulation in those brain regions exhibiting inconsistent patterns. These 
results could also be attributed to processes other than evidence accumulation. Of the 
clusters reported above, the supplementary motor area and anterior cingulate cortex, the 
anterior insula, inferior frontal gyrus, premotor cortex and thalamus include patterns 
inconsistent with the above assumption. On the other hand, the superior frontal sulcus, the 
angular gyrus, precuneus, medial prefrontal cortex, intraparietal sulcus and visual cortex all 
exhibit largely (though not entirely) consistent patterns. The correlation of BOLD signal and 
sensory evidence in any of these regions could still be used to limit the regions reflecting 
sensory evidence accumulation. However, because none of these regions showed a reversal 
in response for positive and negative correlations (see Figure 6A), this means that these 
candidate regions were only found either in tasks using an interrogation protocol or in tasks 
with a free response protocol, but not in both. If one assumes a generality of an accumulator 
region across both types of tasks, then current evidence does not support that any of these 
signals identified an accumulator region. 
 From these illustrative analyses we conclude that the use of correlations of BOLD 
signal and sensory evidence did not reveal any consistent patterns across both types of task 
protocols that could be used to identify brain regions participating in the accumulation of 
sensory evidence. In addition, following the logic applied above, a number of brain regions 
even showed responses that are inconsistent with this functional role. These conclusions of 
course crucially depend on the assumption that decision-related BOLD responses should 
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increase with sensory evidence in tasks with an interrogation protocol, and decrease in tasks 
with a free response protocol. However, this assumption does not need to be true. 
 First, the conclusions depend entirely on the speed with which accumulation occurs. 
When accumulation is fast, any subtle differences in the BOLD signal across levels of 
sensory evidence might disappear. This, however, would invalidate the method of using 
BOLD correlations with sensory evidence altogether, i.e. the premise of this analysis, which 
was not tested in the present study, but taken for granted, just as was done in other studies. 
Second, the speed-accuracy tradeoff is different between the tasks, i.e. the threshold may in 
fact be lower in the free response protocol than the interrogation protocol, leading to different 
overall levels of brain activity depending on the amount of accumulated evidence. While this 
makes a direct comparison within one study challenging, this should only affect the overall 
slope of the response across different levels of sensory evidence, but not the sign of the 
slope. Third, it is possible that accumulation always occurs only until a threshold is reached, 
after which the signal in that region returns to baseline (Liu and Pleskac, 2011). This should 
lead to a negative relationship of BOLD signal both for both types of response protocols. In 
that case, information would have to be maintained in another brain region; otherwise the 
subject could not respond after a delay. However, this is at odds with neurophysiological 
results demonstrating that neuronal activity remains high until a response is executed 
(Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). Fourth, subjects may continue to accumulate information 
even when the response has been carried out – or more generally – the accumulation 
process may not follow the expected patterns. Again, this disagrees with neurophysiological 
findings (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002) and also disagrees with 
the premise for carrying out this type of correlation, not with the conclusions drawn from this 




Figure 6 Peaks of reported results of studies showing correlations of BOLD signal and sensory evidence 
in the visual modality. The results are depicted from medial and lateral views from the side and from the 
top. Results in between layers, e.g. from the anterior insula, are projected to the surface. (A) Results are 
grouped in positive (red) and negative (blue) correlations of BOLD signal with sensory evidence, 
independent of the response protocol used. There is no overlap between red and blue dots, 
demonstrating that no brain region shows a reversal across interrogation and free response protocols. 
(B) Results are grouped in consistent (green: speeded and negative correlations, unspeeded and positive 
correlations) and inconsistent responses (red: speeded and positive correlations, unspeeded and 
negative correlations). Inconsistent responses provide evidence against a specific involvement of this 
brain region in perceptual decision-making. 
 
 Taken together, these illustrations show that any assumptions made about the 
relationship between BOLD signal amplitude and sensory evidence accumulation do not 
generalize across tasks. This either means that the correlation between BOLD signal 
amplitude and sensory evidence is not a good neuronal “marker”, or that the results of the 
studies above are in fact not comparable. For example, some tasks were carried out using 
manual responses while others were using saccades. Nonetheless, it is still a matter of 
debate whether evidence accumulation occurs in a response modality-specific or response 
modality-general manner, i.e. whether there is a general decision-making process 
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independent of the motor effector (Heekeren et al., 2006; Tosoni et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2009; 
Bennur and Gold, 2011; Liu and Pleskac, 2011; Rahnev et al., 2011; Hebart et al., 2012; 
O’Connell et al., 2012; Filimon et al., 2013). In addition, it is possible that the accumulation 
process depends on the type of stimulus used (Liu and Pleskac, 2011), i.e. for example that 
the accumulation of evidence about faces vs. houses is computed differently than evidence 
accumulation about motion direction, or even that evidence is accumulated differently for 
different types of motion coherence or stimulus duration. Finally, it is possible that depending 
on speed or accuracy emphasis, different regions are used to accumulate sensory evidence 
(Wenzlaff et al., 2011). This idea is consistent with the recent finding that the duration of 
evidence accumulation can be adjusted to the task demands (Ossmy et al., 2013). The 
inconsistency demonstrated above may be related to one or several of these paradigm-
specific effects. Since most studies are aimed at making conclusions that generalize beyond 
the paradigm to more universal mechanisms, the questions about modality, stimulus, and 
speed-accuracy specificity are important questions that require further investigation. 
 
2.8 Possible solutions to the problem of low functional specificity of fMRI signals  
The problems illustrated in the previous section are a direct consequence of the low 
functional specificity of the BOLD signal, both in terms of temporal and spatial resolution (see 
Chapter 2.4). Were the specificity higher in the temporal domain, then the time course of 
neuronal signals could be used to distinguish evidence accumulation from other unspecific 
signals which follow a different time course of activity. Were the specificity higher in the 
spatial domain, then it would be possible to track evidence accumulation for one choice, but 
not the other (i.e. the accumulation of evidence for choice A, rather than a mixture of all 
possible choices); in that case the processes related to the accumulation of sensory 
evidence could be distinguished from other unspecific processes. 
 One approach to overcome the limit in time resolution has been to extend the 
duration of the accumulation process and look for gradual increases in BOLD responses 
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(Ploran et al., 2007, 2011) rather than steady responses that would rather reflect unspecific 
processes such as attention, or responses that show a marked increase which probably 
reflect choice-related processes and those following the choice. Other studies introduced a 
time between stimulus presentation and response execution to distinguish motor responses 
from evidence accumulation (Tosoni et al., 2008; Liu and Pleskac, 2011; Erickson and 
Kayser, 2013). While these approaches are promising, it also means that sensory evidence 
must be revealed very gradually or that motor responses need to be delayed by several 
seconds, which makes it possible that in this case evidence is accumulated quite differently 
and possibly stored in different regions of the brain than when accumulation and response 
happen within a second or two (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). In addition, changes of mind may 
exert a stronger effect for longer delays which would lead to different signals of sensory 
evidence representation during stimulus encoding than during response execution (Resulaj 
et al., 2009; Bollimunta et al., 2012; Fleming and Dolan, 2012). A possible extension to these 
studies would be a revelation of sensory evidence that varies across time, i.e. making the 
stimulus either more difficult or easier across time. This could introduce a jitter in the task 
difficulty across time, while evidence is accumulated rather continuously, and could be used 
to distinguish unspecific responses that vary with task difficulty from more decision-specific 
signals. 
As an alternative to investigating overall changes in the BOLD signal, MVPA can be 
carried out to directly reveal decision-specific brain signals (Haynes et al., 2007). This 
method can be used find patterns of brain activity that distinguish between two specific 
choices, for example whether the subject chose upward vs. downward motion. MVPA has 
been applied in the field of perceptual decision-making using both region of interest-based 
methods (Pessoa and Padmala, 2007; Serences and Boynton, 2007) as well as “searchlight 
methods” (Li et al., 2009; Hebart et al., 2012), an approach which reveals the amount of 
information in local brain activity patterns across the whole brain (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; 
Haynes et al., 2007). 
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For a valid interpretation of results it is, however, important to carefully control for 
different aspects of the task. For example, the stimulus itself might be strongly correlated 
with the choice of the subject. This problem has been approached in a clever study by Li et 
al. (2009) where the categorical bound was changed, but the stimulus remained the same. 
Alternatively, this problem can be advanced by calculating classification outcomes for 
choices separately for all stimuli: Choice-specific information could be estimated for all 
different stimulus categories separately, thus revealing patterns of brain activity independent 
of the stimulus shown on the screen. This method is analogous to the calculation of choice 
probabilities (Britten et al., 1996) and is particularly well suited for stimuli close to the 
perceptual threshold, because there will be a sufficient number of choices for both 
categories. However, it is still difficult to distinguish the representation of sensory evidence 
alone from signals representing the accumulated evidence using MVPA, which can be seen 
as the major shortcoming of this method. 
In addition, the choice itself may correlate with specific motor responses, revealing 
choice-specific patterns of activity in motor response and motor preparation-related brain 
regions. While this problem can be reduced by long time intervals between choice and motor 
response, alternatively a response-mapping screen can be used to decouple choices and 
motor responses (Hebart et al., 2012). However, if the choice is encoded in motor 
preparation-related brain regions, such a response may be missed by this approach, 
because choices and motor responses may overlap in time which may annihilate the patterns 
used to classify choices. When taking care of these potential shortcomings, MVPA may 




3. Summary and discussion of empirical studies 
 
We discussed in detail Chapter 2 that in contrast to monkey electrophysiology most current 
functional neuroimaging studies in the field of perceptual decision-making suffer from low 
functional specificity. This was supported both on theoretical grounds (Chapters 2.4 and 2.5) 
as well as empirically by a comparison of recent studies that varied the difficulty of perceptual 
tasks (Chapters 2.6 and 2.7). We concluded that the problem of low functional specificity can 
be addressed by using MVPA on patterns of brain activity in fMRI (Chapter 2.8). This is the 
approach taken in the empirical work presented in this dissertation. In the following sections, 
the three studies used to investigate perceptual decision-making and related neuronal 
processes are briefly summarized. The first study investigates the representation of 
perceptual choices when movements cannot be planned in advance. The second study takes 
a closer look at the relationship of decision variables and perceptual confidence. The third 
and final study investigates possible mechanisms of temporary storage of perceptual 
information which can only be reported after an extended delay. 
 
3.1 Study 1: The representation of perceptual choices independent of motor plans 
There are two competing frameworks of how perceptual decisions are represented in the 
brain. One framework assumes that perceptual decisions are encoded as choices among 
several competing stimulus interpretations, while the other assumes that decisions are 
reflected as choices between multiple actions. In the former framework, perceptual decisions 
are only the consequence of the act of categorizing, or more generally of interpreting the 
incoming sensory information (Baars, 1983; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001); here the 
interpretation of sensory information is relayed to motor structures that later are used to 
execute the choice. In the other framework, incoming sensory information is related to the 
intention of an agent to execute a response (O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Cisek, 2007; Shadlen 
et al., 2008; Freedman and Assad, 2011). If the agent knows about the possible courses of 
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actions depending on the stimulus properties, then the incoming stimulus information is 
mapped directly to brain regions involved in motor planning. In other words, the interpretation 
of sensory evidence takes place in a format that is already mapped to the motor intention 
afforded by the incoming sensory information.14 
 Monkey electrophysiology studies indicate that it is possible to accumulate sensory 
evidence in form of an intention to act, i.e. as a motor plan. The reason for this is that they 
find signatures of evidence accumulation in brain regions that are thought to be related to 
planning and initiating a motor response (Horwitz and Newsome, 1999, 2001; Gold and 
Shadlen, 2000, 2003; Hernández et al., 2000; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Roitman and 
Shadlen, 2002; Romo et al., 2004; Hanks et al., 2006; Churchland et al., 2008; Kiani and 
Shadlen, 2009; Bollimunta et al., 2012). Although these results revealed many features of the 
alleged accumulation process, the generality of these results in terms of decision-making is 
still disputed. Indeed, it is possible that evidence is accumulated in an abstract format and 
only relayed to brain regions representing motor plans when the appropriate motor response 
is known in advance. Human neuroimaging would be invaluable for identifying candidates for 
such brain regions, which could later be investigated in more detail with monkey 
electrophysiology. A number of human neuroimaging studies used multiple response 
effectors to identify brain regions that respond irrespective of the motor response (Heekeren 
et al., 2006; Tosoni et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2009; Liu and Pleskac, 2011). They reported 
conflicting results, with some supporting the notion of abstract accumulation (Heekeren et al., 
2006; Ho et al., 2009; Liu and Pleskac, 2011) – albeit all with different candidate regions – 
while others found no such evidence (Tosoni et al., 2008). 
An alternative way of investigating whether decisions are represented in an abstract 
format is to reveal the set of possible motor responses to the subject only after the stimulus 
has been shown. Using this approach, monkey electrophysiology studies reported a 
14 A possible challenge for the second framework is the existence of abstract decisions, where the 
response modality is unknown in advance. However, the sensory information could be translated into 
structures that encode not a motor plan per se, but into structures encoding a rule (Shadlen et al., 
2008): “If another stimulus X occurs which signals the necessary response Y, then carry out response 
Y, otherwise carry out response Z.” 
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representation of abstract decisions in dlPFC (Gold and Shadlen, 2001), as well as the 
superior colliculus (Horwitz et al., 2004). However, these studies only found a small number 
of cells responding irrespective of the goal of the choice, and the results in the superior 
colliculus could also reflect a spatial response rather than the perceptual decision. Stronger 
evidence was provided more recently by recordings in monkey LIP (Bennur and Gold, 2011). 
This study reported the accumulation of sensory evidence, the encoding of a response rule 
and the saccadic motor response, all multiplexed within the same neurons. However, this 
study focused on a single brain region in the macaque, and it is unclear whether other brain 
regions represent decisions in an abstract format and if these results generalize to decisions 
not reflecting a saccadic response. 
In our first study (Hebart et al., 2012) we investigated the representation of perceptual 
choices about motion direction independent of motor plans in humans, using a design in 
which the association of motor response (left or right button press) was revealed to the 
subject only after the stimulus had been shown. This design effectively prevented the 
accumulation of evidence in a motor format. We used MVPA in a searchlight approach 
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Haynes et al., 2007) to search throughout the entire brain for local 
patterns of brain activity informative about the choice of subject. In addition, we varied the 
amount of sensory evidence available to the observer. This allowed us to address another 
question: How are perceptual choices represented depending on the amount of sensory 
evidence available to the observer? The amount of information about choices buried in local 
patterns of activity should increase with increasing sensory evidence available. Other than 
the mean BOLD signal, this result can be interpreted meaningfully as being specific to the 
choice of the subject. In a second step we could then investigate the shape of this effect 
across levels of sensory evidence. A region related to sensory evidence and evidence 
accumulation should show increases in information with increasing sensory evidence. 
However, this approach could also reveal other patterns. For example, subjects could adapt 
their accumulation to the demands of the task, as has been suggested earlier (Philiastides et 
al., 2006; Philiastides and Sajda, 2007). Indeed, if the task is very simple, then subjects 
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could directly read-out information from those brain regions representing sensory evidence 
and only resort to separate evidence accumulation when it is afforded by the task demands. 
 
Figure 7: Results of Study 1, using multivariate pattern analysis in a searchlight framework. 
Both early visual and left posterior parietal cortex carried information about the choice of the 
subject. While information in early visual cortex was above chance even for zero motion 
coherence and increased with increasing levels of coherence, information in left posterior 
parietal cortex decreased with increasing motion coherence. 
 
The main results of this study are threefold (Figure 7). First, we found that both early 
visual and left posterior parietal cortex represented subjects’ choices independent of motor 
plans. Second, even at zero motion coherence early visual cortex was found to carry 
information about the choice of the subject. Third, while information in early visual cortex 
increased with motion coherence, the reverse pattern was found in left posterior parietal 
cortex: The easier the decision was, the smaller the amount of information about the choice 
in this brain region. The increase in sensory evidence mirrored in early visual cortex is in line 
with an increasing subjective representation of the perceptual motion signals even at an early 
stage of visual processing, rather than reflecting only the stimulus presented on the screen 
(Ress et al., 2000; Ress and Heeger, 2003). On the other hand, decreases of information in 
left posterior parietal cortex point towards a separate mechanism of decision-making that is 
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most informative when choices are difficult. This could reflect an adaptive accumulation 
mechanism that only comes into play when evidence is weak. When a lot of sensory 
evidence is available, the subjects could determine the choice from signals in those regions 
representing sensory evidence (Uchida et al., 2006). Alternatively, this signal could refer to 
the read-out the representation of the criterion of the subject, which has a particularly strong 
influence at lower motion coherences since in the absence of meaningful sensory input the 
choice should on average be determined by the criterion of the subject (Hanks et al., 2011). 
Taken together, our results show for the first time unambiguously the representation 
of perceptual decisions without motor plans in humans. Both early visual and left posterior 
parietal cortex contribute to perceptual decisions, but differently depending on the amount of 
sensory evidence. This finding points towards more flexible decision-making processes than 
has previously been assumed. In addition, the left posterior parietal cortex can serve as a 
region that carries a more abstract format of perceptual decisions of motion. It remains to be 
seen if this result generalizes to other forms of perceptual decision-making. Although 
speculative, it is possible that accumulation of evidence happens in or near those sensory 
brain regions that encode the stimuli. For example, auditory stimuli could lead to evidence 
accumulation in or around auditory cortex. Recently, it has been shown that working memory 
storage takes place in early visual cortex and that both visual stimuli and working memory 
traces have similar neuronal patterns (Harrison and Tong, 2009). This demonstrates the 
capacity to store information in the same regions where new information enters in. According 
to this idea, only when evidence cannot be accumulated in a sensory format, a re-distribution 
to higher-level brain regions becomes necessary (Bennur and Gold, 2011). When the 
appropriate motor response is known in advance, this signal is relayed directly to motor 
structures. This relaying of information would constitute an evolutionary advantage, because 
it allows the observer to respond as soon as enough evidence has been accumulated, rather 
than having to wait for motor preparation until sufficient evidence has been accumulated 




3.2 Study 2: The relationship between perceptual decision variables and confidence 
Perceptual decisions most often result in discrete choices, such as whether or not a 
radiologist diagnoses some tissue to be malignant or benign. These discrete choices are 
thought to be based on integrated evidence that is available to the senses, for example the 
local intensity of a CT image. People seem to have access to the quality of information 
driving their choices, because they can report their certainty in their choices. This ability to 
report the amount of perceptual information that is guiding our choices is known as 
perceptual confidence. Confidence enables observers to correctly predict the consequences 
of their own decisions in a more fine-grained manner as would be possible by making use 
only of their choices. It allows them to choose a compromise between multiple response 
alternatives when available. It can be used to justify choices to others and to weigh one’s 
own evidence against that of other people. But confidence can also serve as a learning 
signal: Instead of using discrete choices and comparing them against the outcome of a 
decision, observers can update their predictions about the world more precisely and learn 
from violations of their predictions. By using their knowledge about the probability of states in 
the environment, confidence can also serve as an internally generated feedback signal. 
Previous animal electrophysiology investigations of confidence have shown that a 
confidence signal can be found in the orbitofrontal cortex of rats (Kepecs et al., 2008), and a 
signal related to the DV in macaque LIP has been found to predict when a monkey was 
going to opt out on a difficult decision, in other words reflecting the confidence of the monkey 
in that decision (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). How confidence is computed in the human brain 
has remained poorly understood. Confidence most often shows a strong positive correlation 
with the correctness of decisions (Peirce and Jastrow, 1884) and – when the subject controls 
the speed of response – a negative correlation with RTs (Volkmann, 1934; Reed, 1951). 
Both accuracy and RT are used in behavioral models that describe perceptual decision-
making (see Chapters 1.2 and 1.3), so it is only natural to assume a close relationship of 
perceptual decision-making and confidence (Vickers, 1979). Signal detection theory (Chapter 
1.2) predicts confidence to be a signed form of the unsigned DV: The further away the choice 
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from the criterion, the higher the confidence of the observer (Green and Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). In other words, confidence can be calculated by rectifying 
the DV (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. The relationship of the decision variable and of confidence in the signal detection 
theory framework. (A) Confidence is the absolute distance of the decision variable at trial i 
from the criterion c. (B) The relationship between confidence and the decision variable in a 
graphical format. The further away the decision variable from the criterion, the higher the 
confidence. (C) The relationship expressed in mathematical format. Formula 3 indicates that 
the decision variable can be constructed by multiplying the confidence by the choice of the 
subject. 
 
This simple relationship between these two variables can be used to explore the 
neuronal representation of the perceptual DV, of confidence, and of their relationship. In our 
second study (Hebart et al., submitted), we employed a task of fixed difficulty in which we 
asked subjects to judge the dominant direction of motion in a random dot motion 
discrimination task. Following their choice, subjects were prompted to indicate the confidence 
in their judgment. In that way, we could investigate the neuronal underpinnings of perceptual 
confidence. Importantly, by using the predictions from signal detection theory we inferred the 
perceptual DV from confidence ratings and choices. We then used this variable to investigate 
the neuronal representation of the DV, but could in that way also link the DV to confidence. 
 Perceptual confidence was found to be represented in the BOLD signal amplitude of 
the ventral striatum around the nucleus accumbens: The more confident a subject was, the 
higher the activity in this brain region. This region is typically found to be activated in tasks 
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involving reward, learning, and motivation (Wise, 2004). Activation in this region might reflect 
the rewarding feeling associated with being confident, which would reinforce the observer to 
behave in a similar way again (e.g. to pay attention). This is in line with a striatal evaluation 
signal reported in macaque monkey (Ding and Gold, 2010) and suggests that confidence can 
serve as a learning signal even in the absence of feedback (Daniel and Pollmann, 2012). 
For an unconfounded investigation of the DV, we first controlled for the motion 
direction presented on the screen by selecting brain regions from which we could decode in 
a searchlight classification framework choices independent of the presented motion direction 
(Britten et al., 1996). In the next step, the representation of the DV was investigated using a 
searchlight analysis in a regression framework, but limited to the regions identified in the first 
step. Information about the DV was found predominantly in frontal and parietal brain regions 
(Figure 9). This result is consistent with previous findings regarding the representation of 
perceptual choices (Li et al., 2009) and of the DV in general (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Gold 
and Shadlen, 2000; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). 
 
Figure 9 Results of Study 2, showing brain regions carrying information about the decision 
variable. The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (top row, third from the left, lower cluster) was 
found to represent the decision variable in a format that could be used to predict the response 




In a last step we were interested to find if one or several of these regions exhibited a 
specific covariation with signals in the ventral striatum. To investigate this, we selected the 
searchlights around the peaks from the identified regions, took the predicted labels from the 
DV decoding of these searchlights, and transformed them according to signal detection 
theory (Figure 8C) to match the representation of confidence in the ventral striatum. This 
analysis revealed that only the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) showed a specific 
covariation with the ventral striatum as predicted by signal detection theory. The role of the 
vlPFC is in line with previous applications of MVPA to the decoding of perceptual choices 
(Pessoa and Padmala, 2007; Li et al., 2009). The finding of this specific covariation suggests 
a simple mechanism for the “construction” of perceptual confidence: Choice-specific DVs in 
the vlPFC are pooled and rectified to compute perceptual confidence in the ventral striatum. 
The bigger the activity levels of any of the choice-selective prefrontal populations, the bigger 
the response of the striatal neurons encoding confidence. 
These results provide a better understanding of how confidence could be constructed 
from DVs. In addition, they provide support for signal detection theory as a model linking 
perceptual decision-making and confidence. This is because the results suggest a simple 
and direct transformation between the representation of decisions and confidence in the 
human brain that is consistent with signal detection theory. According to this approach, the 
ability of subjects to report their confidence does not need to rely on a separate “confidence”-
accumulation process (Busey et al., 2000). Rather, confidence can be seen as the direct 
result of the DV. However, there are three aspects of confidence that are not explained by 
this model: First, it has been shown that confidence cannot fully be explained by the DV, but 
rather that observers vary in their ability to report their confidence (Fleming and Dolan, 
2012). However, variability in the ability to report one’s confidence could also be explained by 
noise added to the transformation process of the DV to confidence which might vary between 
subjects and may depend on other cognitive mechanisms that would be found by 
investigating this variability between subjects (Fleming et al., 2010, 2012). Second, people 
often are far too confident or too inconfident in their decisions, reflecting a specific bias in 
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their confidence reports (Adams and Adams, 1961; Björkman et al., 1993). This criterion shift 
might relate to their inability to report their confidence appropriately, but is not captured by 
the direct transformation depicted above. However, assuming that within a given task the 
relative difference between two ratings is preserved, this is not a problem for the calculation 
of confidence from the DV or vice versa. In other words, the criterion acts as a constant in 
the transformation process described above, so only relative confidence is derived from the 
DV, not the absolute confidence level. Third, signal detection theory is a model that does not 
make any predictions about RTs, and only recently models have been proposed that 
combine accuracy, RTs, and confidence judgments (Ratcliff and Starns, 2009; Pleskac and 
Busemeyer, 2010). In the future, neuroimaging experiments should be carried out that 
incorporate exactly the relationship of these three variables to get a more complete 
understanding of the emergence of confidence judgments in the human brain. 
 
3.3 Study 3: The representation of the contents of visual short-term memory in visual 
and parietal cortex 
Visual short-term memory (VSTM) reflects an active representation of perceived or imagined 
visual information that can be used in ongoing cognitive tasks and that can last for several 
seconds (Luck, 2007). Not surprisingly, VSTM also plays an important role in perceptual 
decision-making tasks, which is supported by two pieces of evidence. First, perceptual 
decision-making tasks often require comparing two successive stimuli, where the first acts as 
a reference and the second as the judgment stimulus. If the time interval between the two 
visual stimuli exceeds the critical duration of the short-lived, passive form of memory called 
“iconic memory” (Sperling, 1960; Landman et al., 2003), this requires an active 
representation of the first stimulus in VSTM. Most experiments in perceptual decision-making 
employing this type of comparison are carried out in the tactile domain, where comparisons 
are made between vibration frequencies (Mountcastle et al., 1990). Interestingly, the same 
neurons that fire throughout the delay period between both stimuli and reflect the first 
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stimulus can encode the difference between the two stimuli and thus the DV (Romo et al., 
2002). In other words, there might be an overlap between the representation of short-term 
memory and the DV. 
 The other piece of evidence comes from perceptual decision-making tasks using 
interrogation protocols in which the decision can only be carried out after a specific delay that 
is controlled by the experimenter. Here the subject needs to hold a representation of the 
decision in memory until a response can be executed. Interestingly, area LIP which has been 
shown to carry a DV for eye-movement decisions (see Chapter 1.6) is also active in a 
spatially specific manner when stimuli need to be maintained in VSTM (Constantinidis and 
Procyk, 2004). In fact, most studies on the role of LIP in perceptual decision-making use a 
memory-guided saccade task to isolate neurons that might carry a representation of the 
evolving DV (Colby et al., 1996; but see Meister et al., 2013). These pieces of evidence 
suggest a close link between VSTM and perceptual decision-making. Indeed, one can easily 
imagine many real-life situations in which one carries out inter-temporal decisions or in which 
the perceptual choice needs to be maintained in short-term memory. For that reason, it 
makes sense that the same neurons that encode perceptual decisions are also used to 
represent the remembered content of the stimulus. 
However, to date very little is known about whether posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in 
humans is memory content-specific or content-unspecific, i.e. whether it stores information 
about visual stimuli or whether it merely carries a signal that is used to maintain a 
representation of the memorized content elsewhere in the brain. An abundance of studies 
have shown that activity in PPC increases during short-term memory tasks (reviewed in 
Wager and Smith, 2003) and that the level of activity scales with memory load (Todd and 
Marois, 2004). However, these findings are in line both with a content-specific and a content-
unspecific representational format and alone do not distinguish between these two 
alternative explanations for the role of PPC in VSTM. Others believe that memory content is 
re-represented into prefrontal cortex (Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Courtney, 2004; Funahashi, 
2006). A third view is that the same neurons encoding visual stimuli contain the architecture 
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to represent remembered stimuli (Postle, 2006). Harrison and Tong (2009) confirmed this 
third view recently by showing that already early visual cortex can carry a representation of 
items held in VSTM, although the mean BOLD signal indicated the absence of a 
representation in this region. This demonstrated that a re-representation of visual stimuli in 
parietal or even frontal cortex does not seem to be a necessary requirement. However, the 
authors focused on visual cortex alone, leaving open if visual memory content is stored 
elsewhere in the brain. The representation of perceptual DVs in a memory format in parietal 
cortex would have the advantage of using the same architecture for both types of cognitive 
processes.15 
 
Figure 10 Results of Study 3, demonstrating a representation of the memorized visual short-
term memory content in early visual, but also posterior parietal cortex (top panel). The 
prediction accuracy of the items held in memory varied across time, but was robust throughout 
the delay period (bottom panel). 
 
15 In fact, it could also be that evidence is accumulated in primary sensory brain regions which would 
also confirm the “same architecture” view. On the other hand, current evidence from monkey 
electrophysiology speaks against this interpretation (Britten et al., 1996; Salinas et al., 2000). In 
addition, a representation of DVs in a non-sensory format would be less susceptible to disturbance 
through other incoming stimuli.  
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In our third study (Christophel et al., 2012) we investigated which brain regions carry 
information about the remembered stimulus. A representation of this content in PPC would 
speak in favor of a shared representation of memory and perceptual decisions. We used a 
delayed match-to-sample task in which subjects had to remember one of four complex 
artificial color patterns. Complex color patterns were used to prevent storage in a non-visual 
format. Two of these stimuli were shown successively at the beginning of each trial, and a 
retro-cue indicated which of them had to be maintained in short-term memory. After a delay, 
two new stimuli were shown which were more or less similar to the remembered stimulus, 
and subjects had to indicate which one they thought to be more similar. Information about the 
representation of the stimuli was investigated using a searchlight analysis, time-resolved 
across the entire delay period. 
We found information about the remembered content in early visual cortex and 
posterior parietal cortex (Figure 10). The representation of the content of VSTM in early 
visual cortex is consistent with previous findings (Harrison and Tong, 2009; Serences et al., 
2009). We extend these results by showing a representation of memorized stimuli in brain 
regions that are not predominantly sensory. At the same time, the absence of a signal 
indicating storage in prefrontal cortex suggest that this brain region is predominantly involved 
in the access to VSTM (McNab and Klingberg, 2007; Edin et al., 2009). 
Taken together, these results suggest that in addition to early visual cortex, PPC 
carries a representation of visual information stored in short-term memory. This 
representation could possibly take the form of a visual salience map (Koch and Ullman, 
1985; Nothdurft, 2000) which indicates the importance of attending to each spatial location of 
the stimulus (Itti and Koch, 2000). This attentional importance is closely related to eye-
movements (Itti, 2005) and thus provides a subtle link to the intentional framework of 
perceptual decision-making (Shadlen et al., 2008). In this framework, perceptual decisions 
reflect the intention of the agent, for example to perform an eye-movement. If this saliency 
representation is maintained, the subject could in fact store the picture in form of a sequence 
of eye movements that indicate visual search along the stimulus of interest. 
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Future studies should pinpoint whether the representational format in VSTM tasks in 
PPC reflects a representation of the stimulus itself, the salience of the stimulus, or a different 
variable. Additional research is also needed to elucidate the connection between storage of 
VSTM and perceptual DVs within the same experiment. This would greatly aid our 
understanding of the neuronal mechanisms subserving perceptual decision-making. 
4. General discussion 
 
 
In this dissertation, we investigated the neuronal mechanisms underlying perceptual 
decision-making and confidence in humans. In Chapter 1, we introduced the theoretical 
framework and important terminology and reviewed the existing literature on perceptual 
decision-making. In Chapter 2 we compared the specificity of monkey electrophysiology 
studies of perceptual decision-making to those employing functional imaging in humans and 
revealed a gap in the level of description of human fMRI studies, related to the low temporal 
and spatial resolution of this technique. We suggested that this gap could be bridged by 
increasing the functional specificity of the fMRI signal using MVPA. In Chapter 3, we report 
our own research carried out to investigate the neuronal structures involved in perceptual 
decision-making and confidence in humans. In particular, we focused on three aspects of 
perceptual decision-making. In the first study we showed which brain regions carry a 
representation of perceptual decisions in an abstract format and elucidated the differential 
involvement of early visual areas and posterior parietal cortex in demanding perceptual 
decisions. In the second study, we demonstrated a representation of the perceptual DV in 
various regions of the cerebral cortex and related this representation in the right vlPFC to a 
signal in the ventral striatum reflecting the confidence of the subject. In the third study, we 
demonstrated that posterior parietal cortex carried a representation of stimuli held in VSTM, 




4.1 Relationship between the first two studies of this thesis 
Both in the first study (“abstract decisions”) and in the second study (“decision variables and 
confidence”) we investigated the neuronal representations of perceptual decisions. These 
studies share several key aspects: First, in both studies we employed a random dot motion 
discrimination task. Second, in both studies we decoded the perceptual choice from patterns 
of brain activity throughout the entire brain using a searchlight approach (Kriegeskorte et al., 
2006; Haynes et al., 2007). Third, both studies used a response mapping screen to 
decorrelate perceptual choices from motor responses, revealing more abstract 
representations of perceptual decisions than those bound to motor responses. In both 
studies we could reveal patterns of brain activity reflecting the choice of the subject. 
Although our studies shared these similarities, there were also differences in the 
design which might explain the slightly different patterns of results found in the two studies. 
Indeed, while in the first study choices were decoded only from early visual and left posterior 
parietal cortex only, large aspects of the cerebral cortex were shown to encode choices in 
the second study. Why did we find a representation of choices in early visual cortex in the 
first study, but not in the second? This seeming discrepancy might relate to the different 
stimulus characteristics of the random dot motion stimulus between the two studies. It has 
been shown previously that different stimulus characteristics of random dot motion stimuli 
can lead to largely varying behavioral responses (Pilly and Seitz, 2009). For that reason, it is 
no surprise that this difference can also lead the subjects to recruit different neuronal circuits 
depending on the task, for example when required to pool information from larger or smaller 
receptive fields. Another possibility is that the stimulus intensity used in Study 2 was not high 
enough to generate significant results at a whole-brain corrected level of statistical 
significance. While this readily explains the findings in early visual cortex, this does not 
explain why the left posterior parietal cortex showed decreasing responses in Study 1, which 
was not reported in Study 2. In fact, we could not investigate this relationship in Study 2, 
because we held the objective stimulus difficulty constant, while it was varied in Study 1. 
However, one might expect a similar relationship within a difficulty level for different levels of 
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confidence. To test for this relationship, we ran a post-hoc analysis on the data in Study 2, 
but found no region with a negative relationship between confidence and choice decoding 
accuracy. If it is true that the variation in confidence in Study 2 can be related to variations in 
performance across different levels of stimulus difficulty in Study 1, then this suggests that 
the variability in confidence in Study 2 is too small to mirror the much larger variation in 
stimulus difficulty in Study 1. Alternatively, as suggested in Chapter 3.1, the expectation of 
the subjects about the difficulty of the stimulus might lead them to recruit regions differently 
depending on the difficulty of the task. Since stimulus difficulty was always rather high in 
Study 2 and did not vary across trials, the strategy of adapting the accumulation mechanism 
to the task demands would not be helpful in this context. In contrast, the largely varying 
amounts of sensory evidence in Study 1 would encourage such adaptive strategies. The 
larger effects across the entire brain reflecting perceptual choices in Study 2 might relate (a) 
to the larger number of trials that entered decoding of choices than in Study 1 where each 
difficulty level was decoded separately, (b) the lower variability between trials related to the 
stimulation and (possibly) adaptive strategies, and (c) to the larger intertrial interval in the 
task that employed confidence ratings which could lead to better separation of the BOLD 
signal between trials. 
 In addition to the findings reported in the studies, this comparison of results indicates 
that abstract perceptual choices are encoded across multiple regions of the human brain and 
that the representation of perceptual choices depends not only on the difficulty of a given 
trial, but also on the expectation of the difficulty across trials. 
 
4.2 Broader implications of the studies of this thesis 
Previous studies investigating perceptual decision-making in humans have often relied on 
mean changes in the BOLD signal amplitude to infer the representation of perceptual 
decisions. We showed in Chapter 2 that this approach does not necessarily lead to findings 
that are specific to perceptual decisions, but could also reflect other, more general cognitive 
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functions such as performance monitoring, selective attention, or processes related to self-
referential thought (Fox et al., 2005; Buckner et al., 2008). In the studies reported in Chapter 
3, we used MVPA in a searchlight framework to decode patterns of brain activity related to 
behavioral choices and memorized stimuli. With that approach we showed in Study 1 for the 
first time how abstract perceptual choices are represented in the human brain. Our findings 
can help distinguishing between two alternative conceptions of perceptual decisions, one 
assuming that perceptual decisions are encoded in a motor-related code (Shadlen et al., 
2008), and the other that perceptual decisions are calculated elsewhere in a more abstract 
format and are only relayed to motor structures. Current monkey electrophysiology studies 
cannot make this distinction (see Chapter 1.7). The brain regions found in our study, in 
particular the left PPC, can serve as a basis for future studies investigating the 
representational format of abstract perceptual choice. These studies should use MVPA to 
compare the representation of perceptual decisions that can be immediately translated into a 
motor plan to those where concurrent motor planning is not possible. If the same brain region 
is present in both tasks and shows a specific connection to a DV in a motor-related brain 
region only when the motor response is known in advance, this would demonstrate that brain 
regions allegedly carrying a representation of the DV might in fact only reflect a response 
that was computed in a more abstract fashion elsewhere in the brain. In addition, the finding 
that a brain region can show decreasing choice-specific responses is surprising and 
deserves further investigation. Possibly – supported by the results from Study 2 – this points 
towards more adaptive accumulation mechanisms which depend on the difficulty of the task 
(Philiastides et al., 2006; Philiastides and Sajda, 2007). 
 In the second study, by using signal detection theory (SDT) we demonstrated the 
representation of the DV and confidence in the human brain. These results support SDT as a 
model that bridges the gap between perceptual decision-making and confidence, by 
assuming a simple transformation between a DV in left vlPFC and confidence in the ventral 
striatum. The approach developed in our study sets the stage for the investigation of 
numerous other forms of decision confidence in future neuroimaging studies – for example 
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memory confidence or confidence about value-based choices – which may reveal important 
differences in the underlying transformation. Finally, by mapping out the neuronal structures 
involved in the computation of DVs and perceptual confidence throughout the whole human 
brain, our results can guide future neurophysiological studies aimed at characterizing the 
dynamics of DVs and of choice-independent confidence signals, and their transformation, in 
greater detail, to shed more light on the underlying mechanism. 
 In the third study, we showed that early visual cortex and PPC carry a representation 
of the content of VSTM. This result significantly helped to distinguish between different 
theories of VSTM storage and showed evidence for storage in brain regions also involved in 
processing stimuli (early visual cortex) and their spatial relationship (PPC). From the 
perspective of perceptual decision-making, this result can be seen as a first step towards 
answering questions of how the storage of memorized items in PPC can be related to the 
representation of a DV in the same region. 
 
4.3 Closing comments and outlook 
In the history of science great advances have often followed the introduction of new research 
methodology. This methodology allowed addressing questions that previously could not be 
answered, and possibly also questions that had not been asked previously. One such great 
advance was the introduction of MVPA in the searchlight framework to the analysis of BOLD 
fMRI signals (Haxby et al., 2001; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Haynes et al., 2007). The results 
presented in this thesis all rely on the increased sensitivity and specificity brought about by 
this technique. The questions raised in this thesis would have been much more difficult – if 
not impossible – to address with different currently available methodology of brain imaging 
data analysis. 
 Still, there is a long way to go. Even with MVPA, fMRI suffers from low temporal 
resolution. It remains open how information from EEG or MEG can possibly be integrated 
with fMRI without losing the high specificity gained through the use of MVPA. In addition, 
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MVPA can only investigate the amount of information buried in a particular brain region, but 
is non-directional (Jimura and Poldrack, 2012) and most often does not allow answering 
questions about the exact representational format in a particular brain region (Kay et al., 
2008; Mitchell et al., 2008; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Diedrichsen et al., 2013). These 
challenges naturally put a damper on the development of the understanding of the brain 
mechanisms underlying perceptual decision-making in humans. 
On the other hand, we hope to have shown that it is possible with the currently 
available methodology to significantly increase our knowledge about how humans carry out 
perceptual decisions, compute confidence, and represent items in VSTM, if only the right 
questions are asked. These methods – combined with clever research paradigms – will in the 
future guide our understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying cognitive processes and 
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